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COMMENT
The New Wild West: Exploring Western New
York’s Underground, Fraudulent Debt
Collection Industry
NATHAN WOODARD†
INTRODUCTION
It starts with a phone call. You, or worse yet, a friend,
family member, or an ex-spouse, receive a call from an
“attorney.” This “attorney” informs you that a creditor
retained his firm to settle a debt that you allegedly owe. You
are told that a “[two]-part felony complaint” will issue for
your arrest; law enforcement will arrive within the hour to
pick you up on these charges.1 This “attorney” then asks you
to secure any firearms or dogs—for the officers’ safety—and
to arrange for supervision of any minor children.2 You
request verification of this debt, but you are told that their
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Candidate, 2018, University at Buffalo School of Law; B.A. Economics &
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1. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Is No
Genuine Issue to Be Tried at 39, FTC v. Vantage Point Servs., LLC, No. 15-CV6S, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111084 (W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017) [hereinafter Pls.
SoMF]; Phil Fairbanks, Abusive Debt Collector Gets 78 Months in Federal Prison,
BUFF. NEWS (June 1, 2017), http://buffalonews.com/2017/05/31/abusive-debtcollector-gets-78-months-prison/.
2. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 39.
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agency already sent you multiple notices to which you failed
to respond, and the “attorney’s” firm cannot stay your arrest
any longer. Next, you are told that the only way for you to
avoid arrest is to obtain a court release number, which you
will receive only upon proof of payment. You panic. You do
not have any outstanding debt nor do you recall any prior
dealings with the supposed creditor, but this “attorney”
knows your address, your relatives, and even your social
security number.
You do not have the money but do not want to go to jail,
so you scrape together all the money you can and borrow the
rest. You call back, say you have the money, and ask how to
pay. The “attorney” then informs you that his office only
handles the “legal paperwork” and directs you to call the
firm’s payment processor at another number. Only then do
you learn that, due to your financial history, they will only
accept wire-transfers or money orders. You make the
payment as directed and call the “attorney” back to obtain
your “court release number.” Wishing this nightmare would
end, you call the court and give the clerk your release
number. The clerk, however, has no idea what you are
talking about—your “court release number” is meaningless
to them. Only now, once the panic of imminent arrest
subsided, do you realize that you have been scammed. There
is no “attorney”—the caller was merely a rogue debt collector
engaged in an elaborate, fraudulent scheme designed to prey
on your fear.3
While American consumers fall victim to these devious
debt collection practices every day, debt collection is the

3. See generally Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Against Vantage Point Services, LLC,
et al., FTC v. Vantage Point Servs, LLC, No. 15-CV-6S, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
111084 (W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017) [hereinafter Pls. MSJ] (alleging abusive,
deceptive, and fraudulent tactics one debt collection operation employed to collect
on consumer debt). See also Vantage Point Servs., LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
111084, at *2.
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largest industry in Western New York (WNY).4 Debt
collection ranks number one among consumer complaints
reported to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) each year
by a wide margin.5 In 2016, the FTC received more debt
collection complaints than the next two complaint
categories—imposter scams and identity theft—combined.6
Yet, in WNY, business is booming. Nearly five thousand
people are employed in the industry in WNY.7 The appeal is
obvious: for a minimal capital investment, anyone can open
their own collection agency yielding massive returns.8 In
these small, unregulated collection agencies, unlawful and

4. The Bureau of Labor Statistics map and corresponding table titled
“[m]etropolitan areas with the highest concentration of jobs and location
quotients in this occupation” shows Buffalo, NY, among metropolitan areas with
the highest concentration of debt collections and the most aggregate jobs of all
metropolitan areas listed therein. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS, OCCUPATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES, MAY 2016: 43-3011 BILL AND ACCOUNT COLLECTORS,
(2017), https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes433011.htm. See also Fred O.
Williams, Buffalo Collection Firms Are Part of an Industry Than Too Often Uses
Threats and Lies to Collect Millions in Unpaid Bills, BUFF. NEWS, July 23, 2006,
at
A1,
A8,
http://www.kiplingerprogram.org/kiplinger/projects_art/
fred%20williams.pdf.
5. FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR
JANUARY–DECEMBER 2016 6, 79 (2017) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-january-december2016/csn_cy-2016_data_book.pdf [hereinafter FTC SENTINEL DATABASE]
(accounting for 28% of all consumer complaints received by the FTC in 2016).
6. Id.
7. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., supra note 4; Phil Fairbanks, Buffalo Becomes
‘Ground Zero’ for Abusive Debt Collectors, BUFF. NEWS (Aug. 5, 2017),
http://buffalonews.com/2017/08/05/abusive-debt-collectors-find-home-buffalo/.
But see Interview with Karen Davis, Senior Consumer Fraud Representative,
New York State Attorney General’s Office: Bureau of Consumer Fraud &
Protection, in Buffalo, N.Y. (Feb. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Davis Interview] (alleging
that this number could be much higher because debt collectors frequently do not
report income or employment; she estimates that the actual number is likely
closer to 10,000).
8. Federal prosecutors obtained an audio recording of one collection agency
owner stating that it “did 370 grand [in] the month of March. We’re on a $300,000
a month pace right now.” Rick Pfeiffer, Feds Take Down Local Debt Collection
Operation, NIAGARA GAZETTE (June 28, 2017), http://www.niagaragazette.com/news/local_news/feds-take-down-local-debt-collectionoperation/article_af640bcc-cc91-51ba-a256-44e8f07ec9d4.html.
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devious practices are commonplace.
Part I of this Comment provides a historical background
of debtor-creditor relations in the United States and context
explaining why society, in general, views debtors
unsympathetically. It then explains the debt collection
industry’s rapid, but isolated, development in WNY. Part II
outlines the collection scheme’s development, which is
designed to avoid detection. In this light, Part III outlines the
rampant criminal conduct customary among WNY collectors.
Here, the most egregious practices are discussed
individually. Part IV begins by discussing how such
pervasive illegality grew unfettered in the region before
addressing the particular barriers hindering law
enforcement from stopping these illegal practices. Part IV
also addresses law enforcement’s current response to these
illegal practices and the need for further remedial measures.
This Comment concludes with proposed solutions to reduce
the hindrances encumbering law enforcement, and details
how they could pave the way towards taming the new “Wild
West.”
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND & CONTEXT
In the United States legal system, creditors have
historically enjoyed vastly more favorable treatment than
debtors. The development of bankruptcy law and the
treatment debtors received throughout American history
illustrates creditors’ expansive remedies to recover debts,
demonstrates residual, popular aversion to indebtedness,
and the social rebuke that debtors commonly encounter.9
Early American bankruptcy laws virtually copied those
9. Press Release, N.Y. Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General
Cuomo Sues to Shut Down Buffalo-based Debt Collection Operation That
Illegally Harassed and Threatened Consumers Nationwide (Aug. 18, 2009),
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-general-cuomo-sues-shut-down-buffalobased-debt-collection-operation [hereinafter Cuomo Press Release] (“Collectors
routinely called consumers ‘drunks,’ ‘scumbags,’ ‘deadbeats,’ and, in one instance,
‘a low-life piece of trash.”).
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conceived in England, which treated debtors quasicriminally.10 These laws did not provide protection for
debtors, but rather protected creditors from debtors.11
Common law writs of fieri facias, elegit, and levari facias
provided creditors with powerful measures to recover
outstanding debts.12 A writ of fieri facias authorized the
judicial seizure and sale of a debtor’s chattels;13 elegit forced
an appraisal of the debtor’s goods and chattels;14 and levari
facias authorized judicial seizure and sale of the produce of
a debtor’s land.15 Strikingly, in early England, under certain
circumstances, the law authorized executing debtors who
committed fraudulent acts.16
While debtors received unsympathetic treatment in
early England, they did not fare much better across the pond.
In a recent New York collection action, Southern
Chautauqua County Federal Credit Union v. Moore,17 Judge
Sedita offered a historical overview of imprisonment for
nonpayment of private debts in the United States. He stated:
Deprivation of one’s liberty for nonpayment of a debt was a normal
feature of American commercial life from the colonial era into the
beginning of the nineteenth century. Imprisonment for indebtedness was commonplace with at least two signatories of the Declaration of Independence . . . spending time in jail after neglecting
loans.18

10. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 6–14 (1995).
11. Pfeiffer, supra note 8, at 7.
12. Id.
13. Fieri facias, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
14. Elegit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
15. Levari facias, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
16. Tabb, supra note 10, at 11.
17. 39 N.Y.S.3d 360, 361 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (analyzing whether an arrest
warrant for contempt should issue for nonpayment of a private debt).
18. Id. at 361 (providing a historical analysis of imprisonment arising out of
debtor-creditor relations).
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Subjected to contemporary analysis, the notion of
debtors’ prisons contravenes modern senses of equity; yet, at
that time, debtors who defaulted received worse treatment
than incarcerated criminals.19 Amazingly, “[d]ebtor sizeprisoners were responsible for providing their own food and
clothing, which many could not do while non-debtor
criminals were fed and clothed by the jail.”20
Debtors continued enduring harsh treatment long after
the colonies declared independence. Debtors’ prisons were
not banned under federal law until 1833.21 For perspective,
in Moore, Judge Sedita articulately noted: “Shamefully but
tellingly, laws that permitted the deprivation of one’s liberty
over a private debt were abolished more than three decades
before the abolition of slavery.”22 Yet, for debtors, outlawing
debtors’ prisons amounted to a nominal improvement at
best.23
At their inception, primitive bankruptcy laws provided
debtors little protection. Congress rarely exercised the
powers conferred under the Bankruptcy Clause, which
empowered it “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject

19. John E. Matejkovic & Keith Rucinski, Bankruptcy “Reform”: The 21st
Century’s Debtors’ Prison, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 473, 475–76 (2004)
(explaining the “deplorable” conditions in debtors’ prisons, such as “16 debtors . . .
crowded into a 12-foot square room.”).
20. Id. at 476.
21. Moore, 39 N.Y.S.3d at 361. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2007 (2012) (prohibiting
“imprisonment for debt”). But see Richard E. James, Note, Putting Fear Back into
the Law and Debtors Back into Prison: Reforming the Debtors’ Prison System 42
WASHBURN L. J. 143, 147–49 (2002) (discussing debtors’ prisons’ history in the
United States and arguing that de facto debtors’ prisons still exist because
creditors attempt to use contempt as a means of imprisoning debtors).
22. Moore, 39 N.Y.S.3d at 361.
23. See DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC WELFARE IN NEW YORK
STATE 1609–1866 148 (1938) (asserting that debtors’ imprisonment did not
actually cease until 1881 despite New York “abolishing” the practice 50 years
earlier in 1831); Creola Johnson, Creditors’ Use of Consumer Debt
Criminalization Practices and Their Financial Abuse of Women, 34 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 5, 5–6 (2016) (“To many cash-strapped consumers, however, the
debtors’ prison is alive and well in the twenty-first century.”).
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of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”24 Unless
Congress utilized this power, states remained free to enact
bankruptcy legislation to fill the void.25 Absent congressional
exercise of the Bankruptcy Clause, the prohibition of debtors’
prisons did not bind the states, and imprisoning debtors’
remained a common practice throughout the nineteenth
century.26 During this period, there was no voluntary
bankruptcy, rather, only compulsory filings initiated by
creditors were permitted and obtaining a discharge
depended entirely upon creditors’ consent.27
Today, nonpayment of a private debt is a civil cause of
action.28 As such, debtors are no longer imprisoned simply
for defaulting on outstanding debts.29 Debtors today,
supposedly, are not subjected to nearly as severe treatment
when compared to previous eras.30 On the other hand, as
Moore illustrates, prohibiting imprisonment for nonpayment
gave rise to creditors utilizing contempt motions to imprison
debtors to effectuate the same result.31
Similarly, the deep-seated notion that defaulting on an
obligation represents a quasi-criminal offense has not

24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
25. Tabb, supra note 10, at 13–14 (noting that “states were free to act in
bankruptcy matters for all but 16 of the first 109 years after the Constitution was
ratified.”).
26. Id. at 12–13, 15–16; SCHNEIDER, supra note 23, at 148.
27. Compare Tabb, supra note 10, at 14–15 with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1129
(2012) (requiring at least one impaired class of creditors to approve a
reorganization plan before the debtor-in-possession can obtain a discharge).
28. Southern Chautauqua County Federal Credit Union v. Moore, 39 N.Y.S.3d
360, 362 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (“The penalty imposed for [civil contempt] is designed to
compensate or otherwise further the right of the party in whose favor a judicial
direction was made.”).
29. Tabb, supra note 10, at 16.
30. See id; Moore, 39 N.Y.S.3d at 362.
31. Moore, 39 N.Y.S.3d at 362; Johnson, supra note 23, at 13–25; see James,
supra note 21, at 149–54 (describing creditors employing civil contempt as a
means to imprison debtors).
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evaporated in American society.32 This historical
condemnation of debtors coupled with creditors’
contemporary use of contempt as an alternative means to
imprison debtors demonstrates that obvious remnants of
early-American debtor-creditor jurisprudence remains
today.33 Thus, such antiquated notions suddenly appear less
antiquated than previously assumed.
As debtors gradually started receiving more humane
treatment, the average citizen’s indebtedness propensity
steadily rose. In 2016, in credit card debt alone, the average
American owed $3,600.34 However, this number is skewed
because only forty percent of Americans have outstanding
credit card debt.35 Therefore, among those who do carry a
balance the figure is closer to $16,048—a ten percent
increase since 2013.36 This trend is not a particularly new
development, however, over the past century financial
institutions’ lending propensity skyrocketed.37
For a decade or so leading up to the Great Depression,
Americans drastically shifted their opinions regarding credit
and borrowing and kick-started the credit-based economy
observed today.38 As one economist noted, “societal attitudes
toward borrowers changed radically between 1900 and 1920;
by the mid-1920s, buying on credit was considered normal,
not sinful.”39 As this “buy now, pay later” trend continued,
32. See Cuomo Press Release, supra note 9; Tabb, supra note 10, at 7.
33. See, e.g., Moore, 39 N.Y.S.3d at 361–62; see generally Tabb, supra note 10.
34. Matthew Frankel, The Average American’s Credit Card Debt May Shock
You, USA TODAY (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
personalfinance/2016/10/12/average-credit-card-debt/91431058/.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. See Beverly M. Burden, Credit Cards and Home Equity Loans: You Have
Been Preapproved . . . Why?, 6 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 1, 1 (1998).
38. See Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, Household Debt and the Great Depression,
HOUSE OF DEBT (Mar. 15, 2014), http://houseofdebt.org/2014/03/15/householddebt-and-the-great-depression.html.
39. Id. (quoting Berkley economics professor Martha Olney).
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financers’ lending models evolved as well. Diverse new
lending models developed rapidly to accommodate the needs
of nearly any willing borrower.40 One such development
particularly relevant to debt collection is the so-called
“payday loan.”
Payday loans are short-term, high interest loans that are
available almost instantaneously.41 In theory, a payday loan
allows a debtor to pay his outstanding liabilities rather than
defaulting, and he will repay the loan upon receiving his
paycheck.42 In reality, the interest rates, sometimes as high
as 7300%,43 render these payday loans nearly impossible to
pay back. Consumers get caught in a trap because they
“frequently do not understand the terms of the loans, and
because [payday loans] arguably create a cycle of debt from
which many customers cannot escape.”44 The following
example illustrates how consumers get trapped in this
downward spiral:
Once one has used a payday loan, for example by borrowing $400 at
$25 per $100 in order to pay the rent, the borrower will then owe an
extra $200 every month, unless he or she can get out from under the
initial loan by paying it off. That means there is $200 less

40. See Frankel, supra note 34; Burden, supra note 37, at 1.
41. Pearl Chin, Note, Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation, 2004
U. ILL. L. REV. 723, 724–25 (2004).
42. See id. But see CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS ON
PAYDAY, PAYDAY INSTALLMENT, AND VEHICLE TITLE LOANS, AND DEPOSIT ADVANCE
PRODUCTS
109–12
(2016),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/
Supplemental_Report_060116.pdf [hereinafter CFPB Supp.] (reporting that
“[o]ver 80% of payday loans are reborrowed within 14 days from the same lender,
85% are reborrowed within 30 days, and 88% are reborrowed within 60 days.”).
43. KATHLEEN E. KEEST & ELIZABETH RENUART, THE COST OF CREDIT:
REGULATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 55 (2002); Chin, supra note 41, at 724; Al
Vaughters, Outlaw Debt Collectors in WNY Targeted by Authorities, WIVB NEWS
4 BUFFALO, N.Y. (APR. 24, 2015, 10:58 AM), http://wivb.com/2015/02/26/outlawwny-debt-collectors-targeted-by-ny-ag-and-feds/. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW §
190.40 (2017) (criminalizing charging interest exceeding 25% “per annum or the
equivalent rate for a longer or shorter period” as 2d degree criminal usury, which
is a class E felony).
44. Nathalie Martin & Koo Im Tong, Double Down-and-Out: The Connection
Between Payday Loans and Bankruptcy, 39 SW. L. REV. 785, 786 (2010).
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discretionary income available each month for other household
items or necessities, which is enough money to be significant in
many households, but particularly in households already experiencing cash flow difficulties.45

Predictably, for those who succumb to the pressure of
taking payday loans, bankruptcy often follows.46 If there is
not a “casual causation” between bankruptcy filings and
payday loans, at the very least, there is a correlation.47 One
report found that nearly twenty percent of New Mexico
debtors who filed bankruptcy under Chapter 7 took out at
least one payday loan.48 These loans are so notoriously
prejudicial to consumers that some scholars argue that the
practice implicates the Thirteenth Amendment,49 arguing
that payday loans have such high, usurious interest rates
that they effectually force debtors into indentured
servitude.50 Consumers who narrowly escape filing
bankruptcy, including some who do not, get the equally
unpleasant experience of dealing with debt collectors.51

45. Id. at 787.
46. Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause
Bankruptcy? 1 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 1113, 2011) (“For first-time applicants near the 20th percentile of the credit-score
distribution who identify the local average treatment effect, access to payday
loans causes chapter 13 bankruptcy filings over the next two years to double.”)
47. See Martin & Tong, supra note 44.
48. Id. at 788.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
50. Zoë Elizabeth Lees, Note, Payday Peonage: Thirteenth Amendment
Implications in Payday Lending, 15 SCHOLAR 63, 66 (2012). See also CFPB Supp.,
supra note 42, at 132; Johnson, supra note 23, at 29–39 (arguing that women are
more susceptible to paying debt collectors when threatened with arrest);
51. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office W.D.N.Y., Debt Collection
Agency Owner Indicted On 41 Charges; Accused of Bilking Thousands of Victims
Out of Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars (Mar.
4,
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdny/pr/debt-collection-agency-owner-indicted-41charges-accused-bilking-thousands-victims-out [hereinafter DOJ Press Release]
(discussing Buffalo collectors brazenly violating the automatic stay by
misrepresenting themselves as associates of the consumers’ bankruptcy attorney
and threatening criminal prosecution if the debtor did not pay).
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The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA),
defines “debt collector” as “any person who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any
business the principal purpose of which is the collection of
any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect,
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be
owed or due another.”52 By contrast, “creditor” is defined as
any person:
who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is
owed, but such term does not include any person to the extent that
he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for
the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.53

It follows that, “[t]he FDCPA distinguishes between debt
collectors, who are subject to the statute’s requirements, and
creditors, who are not.”54 This small distinction between
creditors, who actually own the right to repayment, and
collectors, complicates an ostensibly straightforward
definition, as collectors devise strategies to avoid collection
law mandates.55
In Ruth v. Triumph Partnerships, the corporate
defendant (“Triumph”), attempting to avoid liability,
asserted that it did not meet the statutory definition of a
“debt collector.”56 Triumph argued that “it is a creditor and
not a debt collector because it purchases delinquent debt
thereby becoming one ‘to whom a debt is owed’ under section
1692a(4) [of the FDCPA].”57 The court held that “a party that
seeks to collect on a debt that was in default when acquired
is a debt collector under the FDCPA, ‘even though it owns
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012).
53. § 1692a(4).
54. Ruth v. Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790, 796 (7th Cir. 2009).
55. See FTC SENTINEL DATABASE, supra note 5, at 81 (noting that in 2016, of
the 859,090 debt collection complaints the FTC received, only 2,146 (0.025%) were
against creditors; the remaining 99.75% were against third party debt collectors).
56. 577 F.3d at 796.
57. Id.
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the debt and is collecting for itself.’”58 In the end, the Ruth
court reversed the district court’s order granting defendant’s
motion for summary judgment,59 but the standard applied
highlights how unique complications can arise from a
standard that depends on the debt’s status when acquired
rather than the parties’ conduct.60
Securitization blurs the ever-finer line between
“creditor” and “collector.”61 Now “paper”—the industry term
for debt—is bought, sold, and traded as frequently as
securities.62 A collector can purchase a portfolio, acquiring all
rights to repayment for the debts contained therein, without
extending any credit whatsoever.63 From a business
prospective, each outstanding debt represents a fraction of
the creditor’s accounts receivable.64 Accounts receivable are
freely transferable assets.65 The securitization process
involves dividing a business’s accounts receivable, or
individual debts, and compiling them into a portfolio.66 Thus,
the purchaser’s risk is limited to the portfolio’s price, while
the original creditor mitigates their potential losses by
selling their right to repayment. In this situation, everyone
wins, except for debtors.
Consumer debt securitization is an example of one
rapidly increasing, deleterious means to advance financiers’
58. Id. at 797 (quoting McKinney v. Cadleway Props., Inc., 548 F.3d 496, 501
(7th Cir. 2008)).
59. Id. at 806.
60. See id.
61. Andreas Jobst, What Is Securitization?, FIN. & DEV. 48, 48–49 (Sept.
2008),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/09/pdf/basics.pdf
(providing a basic overview of the securitization process).
62. See id.
63. See Ruth, 577 F.3d at 796–98; Burden, supra note 37.
64. See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, Assignment of Accounts Receivables Under
Article 9: Structural Incoherence and Wasteful Filing, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 231, 233
(2007).
65. See id. at 233–34.
66. See Jobst, supra note 61, at 48.
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goals in a credit-based economy.67
The supply of consumer loan products such as credit card and home
equity loans has grown because of the profitability of securitizations
of consumer debt instruments. Ten years ago securitizations of consumer loans were virtually unheard of. Today, almost half of all outstanding credit card loans, $180 billion out of $400 billion outstanding, have been securitized and sold.68

This form of securitization is nearly identical to
mortgage-backed securitization; it differs only to the extent
that consumer debts are almost exclusively unsecured.69
This distinction is important. Anyone acquiring a secured
property interest can only foreclose or repossess the
collateral securing the loan once.70 It follows, when secured
creditors fail to comply with the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) or collection laws, their security interest is adversely
affected—they potentially forfeit the right to repossess the
collateral or, in some cases, incur punitive damages.71 This
is not an issue with unsecured debt because no collateral
exists. Therefore, collectors have nothing to lose if they
engage in deceptive, fraudulent, or illegal collection tactics.
Lacking any self-interest compelling them to comply with
collection laws, collectors are virtually unrestrained when
developing and utilizing deceptive or fraudulent collection
schemes.
Likewise, because the securitization process divorces the
original creditor from the underlying obligation, debtors’

67. See id. at 48, 49.
68. Burden, supra note 37.
69. See id. (describing the availability of credit today).
70. See Plank, supra note 64, at 233–38 (highlighting issues in perfection of
security interests in accounts receivable); Davis Interview, supra note 7
(describing multiple collection attempts on the same debt).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2012) (outlining remedies available to debtors harmed
by creditor(s)’ violation of the automatic stay, which expressly provides for
punitive damages in “appropriate circumstances.”); U.C.C. § 9-625 (AM. LAW INST.
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013).
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ability to verify debts is substantially impaired.72 More often
than not, a debt portfolio will change hands many times
before any collection attempts are made. For creditors
disinterested in collections, selling the obligation completely
removes them from the collection process.73 Even if the
original creditor predominately places debt with a legally
compliant collection agency, that agency often is far removed
from the equation by the time the debt lands in WNY.74
Legally compliant agencies will “work” a portfolio for as
long as it remains profitable, but when the revenue stream
starts running dry, there is a strong incentive to sell the
remaining, uncollected debts. This process exemplifies the
economic law of diminishing marginal returns. After an
agency collects a certain percentage of the portfolio, the rate
of return will continually decline.75 To illustrate, imagine a
compliant company successfully collected sixty percent of a
portfolio. That agency is better off selling the remaining forty
percent to another at a discount rate. Selling the portfolio’s
remaining debt allows employees to collect on debt yielding
a higher rate of return.76

72. See Jobst, supra note 61, at 48.
73. See, e.g., Jamie Kocis, United States: Uncertainty in Securitization of
Consumer Debt Continues After Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in Madden v.
Midland Funding, MONDAQ (July 22, 2016), http://www.mondaq.com/
unitedstates/x/512524/securitization+structured+finance/Uncertainty+in+Secur
itization+of+Consumer+Debt+Continues+After+Supreme+Court+Denies+Certio
rari+in+Madden+v+Midland+Funding.
74. See Jake Halpern, Will Guys with Guns Replace the Agency Elizabeth
Warren Created?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/11/26/opinion/sunday/will-guys-with-guns-replace-the-agency-elizabethwarren-created.html?_r=0.
75. For an overview of the law of diminishing marginal returns, see Law of
Diminishing Marginal Returns, FARLEX FINANCIAL DICTIONARY (2012),
https://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Law+of+diminishing+
marginal+returns.
76. Regardless of whether or not the business is run lawfully, profit
maximization is governed by the laws of economics. In the context of collections,
this means selling the partially worked paper until it is no longer profitable. See
id.
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As previously noted, payday loans account for a majority
of the debt WNY agencies collect, which helped fortify the
region as the nation’s “debt collection capital.”77
Notwithstanding the numerous articles documenting the
contemporary issues concerning payday loans, these loans
only contribute to the rogue-debt-collection industry’s rapid
expansion in WNY. 78 The purpose of this Comment is not to
minimalize payday loan’s noxious effects nor detract from
other’s arguments that consumers require greater protection
from and education about pitfalls attending high-interest
borrowing.79 Rather, the purpose is to shed light on other,
often ignored, issues that will not simply evaporate if
remedial measures focus merely on the underlying debt and
ignore the collection tactics employed.
While deleterious in effect, the general notion behind
payday lending is not inherently wrongful.80 Payday loans
operate according to the same fundamental principles as any
other loan: a creditor provides access to capital for a borrower
to cover liabilities or make new purchases, which the
borrower agrees to pay back, over a fixed-term or on demand,
with interest.81 Payday loans follow this basic scheme, with
the caveat that interest is astronomically high and they have
incredibly short fixed-terms.82 Certainly these unfavorable
conditions adversely affect debtors, but, standing alone, they
are not inherently harmful. Nor do lenders disguise or
misrepresent the consumer’s contractual obligations

77. Nick Baumann, Inside the Bizarre, Unregulated World of Debt Collection,
MOTHER JONES (Oct. 25, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/10/
interview-bad-paper-jake-halpern-debt-collectors (“Buffalo, New York—the
fading industrial city that, oddly enough, has become America’s debt-collection
capital.”).
78. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 41, at 724–26.
79. See, e.g., id.
80. See Frankel, supra note 34.
81. Chin, supra note 41, at 724.
82. Id.
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pursuant to the loan agreement.83 Instead, payday lenders
convince desperate consumers to agree to unconscionable
terms.84 Frequent payday loan defaults occur because
consumers erroneously overestimate their ability to repay
the loan, not because they are ignorant as to the contract’s
terms.85 When entering into these agreements they
overzealously estimate their future earning potential.
The ideology that freedom to contract is an inalienable,
individual right remains well-entrenched in American
society. American history reveals that many judges and legal
scholars adhered to this ideology since the nation’s founding.
There is no better example of this than Lochner v. New
York,86 and the so-called Lochner-era that followed. In
Lochner, the Supreme Court struck down a New York law
regulating how many hours bakery employees could work.87
Writing for the majority, Justice Peckham did not merely
state that the freedom to contract conforms with the
prevailing notions of jurisprudence, but held that the
Constitution guaranteed this freedom under the Fourteenth
Amendment.88 While Lochner is widely regarded as “one of

83. See, e.g., Alpha Omega Consulting Grp., Inc., Payday Loan Agreement,
http://www.aocg.com/resources/NM1-CASH%20ADVANCE%20CONTRACT.pdf
(last visited Dec. 16, 2017).
84. Compare Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 459
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding “that where the element of unconscionability is present
at the time a contract is made, the contract should not be enforced.”), with CFPB
Supp., supra note 42, at 109–137 (demonstrating the unconscionable nature of
payday loans).
85. See CFPB Supp., supra note 42, at 100–08. But see Scott A. Schaaf,From
Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING
INST. 339, 349 (2001) (outlining payday lenders arguments that “disclosing the
APR on payday loans is misleading” and that customers have a “very high degree
of satisfaction with the [payday lending] system”).
86. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
87. Id. at 64.
88. Id. at 53 (“The general right to make a contract in relation to his business
is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution.”).
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the most condemned cases in United States history,”89 it
highlights how deeply-rooted the freedom the contract is in
American society.
While the Supreme Court later ostensibly overturned
Lochner,90 the underlying ideology—that freedom to contract
is absolute—has survived. This lingering ideology coupled
with harsh remedies readily available to creditors in
previous eras is largely why collection efforts are not wellmonitored and collection laws are unenforced. It is precisely
this lack of enforcement and industry oversight that caused
Buffalo, New York, to become the new “Wild West,” where
anything goes so long as someone pays.
II. THE COLLECTION SCHEME & HOW IT WORKS
Contrary to popular belief, debt collection is a difficult
business. Nobody enjoys handing over his hard-earned wages
to debt collectors, especially if skeptical of the debt’s validity.
Yet, this is precisely what Buffalo collectors convince debtors
to do every day. How, then, are so many agencies able to
accomplish something that seems counterintuitive? Quite
simply, debt collection is only difficult when it is done
lawfully.91
When the debt collection industry exploded in Buffalo,
debt collectors realized that they could substantially increase
their profit margins by simply ignoring collection laws.
Collectors soon realized that such flagrant illegality would
only succeed if they could disguise their true identities and
trick debtors into believing their legitimacy.92 Luckily for

89. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES
(1980).

AND THE

CONSTITUTION 23

90. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392–93 (1937) (repudiating
Lochner and effectually overturning the decision).
91. See Davis Interview, supra note 7. See generally Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq. (2010).
92. See F.T.C. v. Vantage Point Servs., LLC, No. 15-CV-6S, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 111084, at *3–*4, *7 (W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017).
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these collectors, this is not difficult to accomplish with the
rise of modern technology.93 Thus, Buffalo collection agencies
devised and implemented a three-stage collection approach
specifically designed to confuse debtors and render the
collector’s representations plausible.94
The process begins with a “point caller.” Point callers
make initial contact with the debtors to verify the debtor’s
contact information. They tend to have limited debt
collection experience and are instructed not to deviate from
their “talk-off” scripts.95 First, they will call the debtor’s last
known phone number(s).96 These calls are rarely successful
because debtors often do not answer or their contact
information is outdated.97 If able to reach the targeted
debtor, the point caller leaves a “shake message.”98
A shake message typically involves the caller vaguely
referencing a debt while threatening some form of legal
action to follow if the recipient does not return the call. Some
agencies leave horrendous shake messages to scare debtors,
while others utilize fairly benign scripts that are just
intimidating enough to illicit a response from the debtor. 99

93. E.g., The Ultimate Skip Tracking Tool that Delivers Deeper Insights,
TLOXP: COLLECTIONS, http://www.tlo.com/collections-video (last visited Nov. 1,
2017).
94. Vantage Point Servs., LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111084, at *7 (noting
that “by separating the debt collection business into (at least) three parts—the
owner of the debt, the call initiator, and the payment processor—Defendants
hoped to insulate themselves from any wrongdoing on the part of those who
contacted consumers.”). See also Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 3, (“Defendants’
outrageous conduct generated scores of consumer complaints, but they structured
the operation to delay or evade liability for their illegal practices.”).
95. See Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 34–48 (describing the content of “talk-off”
scripts used by WNY debt collectors).
96. See id.
97. Many complaints report harassment of the debtor’s relatives or friends
where the collector does not stop pestering the recipient until they locate the
debtor. See FTC SENTINEL DATABASE, supra note 5.
98. Id. at 36–37.
99. See id. at 34–48.
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Inexperienced collectors pose the risk of mistakenly
revealing information that could cause a debtor to question
the legitimacy of the company or caller. Therefore, requiring
strict adherence to prewritten scripts insulates agencies
from early exposure.
If the point callers are unable to reach the debtor
directly, they begin calling the debtor’s family and friends.100
They will continue calling until someone who knows the
debtor answers.101 Once point callers reach a debtor’s friend
or family member, they provide a vague but intimidating
explanation for the call to compel whomever answers to scare
the debtor into returning the call.102 If one does get a live
debtor on the phone, he plays dumb and tells the debtor to
call the “[l]egal [f]rim [sic] that hired [him].”103 Point callers
provide debtors a different number to call someone who will
explain the situation, and, if questioned, the point callers
state that they are merely a “process server” or something
similar.104 And so begins the second phase.
When debtors call “the firm” handling the case, a “live
server” answers—invariably with a misleading or fake
company name.105 Based on the point callers’
representations, debtors believe they are speaking with an

100. See id. at 57–59.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See Declaration of Colin A. Hector in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment at Exhibit 158, FTC. v. Vantage Point Servs., LLC, No. 15CV-6S, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111084 (W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017).
104. Declaration of Heath Earls Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 at 2, FTC v.
Vantage Point Servs., LLC, No. 15-CV-6S, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111084
(W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017) [hereinafter Earls Decl.]; Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at
32–33, 83.
105. Declaration of Karen Davis Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 at 22–23, FTC
v. Vantage Point Servs., LLC, No. 15-CV-6S, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111084
(W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017) [hereinafter Davis Decl.]; Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at
29. Cf, Pfeiffer, supra note 8 (“Collana was an associate of Ciffa’s who established
shell companies, payment processing accounts, and bank accounts to facilitate
taking payments from individuals.”).
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attorney or law enforcement official.106 Alternatively, once
point callers confirm debtors’ contact information, live
servers start calling debtors from a spoofed phone number.107
This is where the real intimidation starts. Messages are
easily saved, but scared debtors very rarely record live calls,
allowing live servers to threaten debtors with anything from
excessive fines to substantial prison time.108 These threats
may cause even suspicious debtors to question whether or
not they should simply pay in case the threats are true.109
Live servers are experienced collectors who know what
to say and how to say it to intimidate debtors.110 They are
able to cleverly evade questions directed at the company’s
legitimacy or physical location.111 Live servers are rude,
demanding, and argumentative, which allows them to
dominate the conversation.112 Similarly, they possess a
shocking dearth of empathy.113 They maintain a threatening
and cold attitude throughout the conversation regardless of
the hardships they knowingly force debtors to endure.114
After speaking with live servers, many debtors are terrified
and ultimately agree to do whatever it takes to come up with
the money demanded.115
If the debtors agree to pay, the live servers provide
106. See, e.g., Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 1; Fairbanks, supra note 1.
107. See Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 28, 30.
108. See id. at 35–48.
109. See Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 1; Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 35–48.
110. See, e.g., Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 1, 2–3.
111. See Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 33–34.
112. See, e.g., Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 2.
113. See, e.g., Zeke Faux, Millions Are Hounded for Debt They Don’t Owe. One
Victim Fought Back, With a Vengeance, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (Dec. 6, 2017)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-12-06/millions-are-hounded-fordebt-they-don-t-owe-one-victim-fought-back-with-a-vengeance.
114. See generally Earls Decl., supra note 104 (discussing how a debt collector
was capable of forcing the individual to provide a payment despite his struggle to
find the money).
115. E.g., id. at 1–2.

2018]

WILD WEST OF DEBT COLLECTION

259

another number for the debtors to call when they have the
funds to make a payment, which they often need to borrow
from friends or family.116 This is the third phase of the
scheme. If the debtors inquire why they need to call another
number to make a payment, live servers have seemingly
plausible answers—e.g., they only handle the legal issues—
the other number is for the payment processor.117 Many
debtors do not think twice about this explanation because
they believe separate payment processing is commonplace
and fear what consequences might follow.
Portfolio owners need not sell the portfolio to have
another agency “work” it, they may also “place” it.118 Placing
a portfolio is analogous to renting the rights to collect to
another company, who remits collection commissions back to
the owner—it’s like a reverse consignment.119 As detailed
below, this causes conflict when collectors illegitimately
continue working debt portfolios after they are subsequently
placed with another agency.120
Many people assume that there is official documentation
for these portfolios. They are misinformed. Debt portfolios
are nothing more than spreadsheets with the original
lender’s name, the principle amount of the debt, and the
debtor’s information—which is frequently outdated.121
Collectors can easily download, save, and share these
portfolios even when they are no longer legitimately working

116. See id. at 1–2; Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 3–4; Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at
20–22.
117. See Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 2–4; Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 3–5, 9–
16; Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 68–77.
118. See Ruth v. Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790, 796 (7th Cir. 2009) (describing
debt brokers buying and selling debt, but distinguishing themselves from
collectors); Davis Interview, supra note 7.
119. See U.C.C. § 9-102(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013) (defining
“consignment” under the U.C.C.).
120. Interview with Anonymous Informant, former Vantage Point Services
Debt Collector, in Buffalo, N.Y. (Oct. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Informant Interview].
121. Johnson, supra note 23, at 25–27.
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it.122 It is a common practice among many rogue collection
shops to keep these portfolios after working them.123 This
practice results in portfolios containing illegitimate debts.124
Because debts are bought, placed, and traded so often,
creditors, collectors, and debtors have a hard time
maintaining accurate information.125 Therefore, when
portfolio owners subsequently place a portfolio with another
collection agency, concurrent attempts to collect the same
debt can occur, rendering verification impossible for the
debtor.126
Sometimes these illegitimate collection attempts are
merely negligent and involve no intentional malfeasance.
Unfortunately, however, negligent mistakes are the
exception. A majority of illegitimate collection attempts
result from collectors’ conscious and voluntary acts designed
to deceive and exploit debtors.127 Collection agencies will
frequently work a portfolio then, in turn, sell it, including
debts they’ve already collected, to another agency as a
purportedly valid debt portfolio.128 Rogue collection agencies
have no qualms about collecting a debt before reselling it,129
122. See id.; Davis Interview, supra note 7.
123. Informant Interview, supra note 120.
124. Johnson, supra note 23, at 25–27.
125. Informant Interview, supra note 120.
126. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER COMPLAINTS
(2017), https://data.consumerfinance.gov/dataset/Consumer-Complaints/s6ewh6mp [hereinafter CFPB Database] (compiling debt collection complaints
received by the CFBP, many of which state that the collection agency could not
verify the debt or provided insufficient verification).
127. See Interview with Kevin Sibley, Asst. Special Agent in Charge, U.S Dep’t
of Homeland Security, in Buffalo, N.Y. (Mar. 21, 2017) [hereinafter ASAC Sibley
Interview].
128. E.g., Phil Fairbanks, Debt Collector Accused of ‘Re-Dos’ to Collect Multiple
Times, BUFF. NEWS (June 27, 2017), http://buffalonews.com/2017/06/26/fedscharge-local-debt-collector-fraud/?utm_campaign=puma&utm_medium=social&
utm_source=Twitter (addressing how WNY agencies are engaging in “re-do’s,”—
or double collections; naturally, if collectors will re-collect debts they will clearly
resell them as well).
129. Informant Interview, supra note 120.
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as doing so yields greater profits.
Greater profits sufficiently incentivize collectors to
forego their obligation of good-faith and fair-dealing, or even
common decency.130 This is especially true when a portfolio
does not “hit”—meaning debtors are not paying—because
acting within the socially defined moral boundaries does not
generate revenue.131 Therefore, collectors will leave the
collected debts in a portfolio, but they resell or place the debt,
causing another agency to inadvertently rework it.132 This
maximizes recovery for sunk costs expended if they acquire
an otherwise unprofitable portfolio.
Aggregately, these practices amount to a problem
necessitating a solution beyond merely regulating payday
loans.133 Payday loans are not the only type of debt being
collected.134 Rogue collectors will work any type of consumer
debt, including credit card debt,135 outstanding medical bills,
and even student loans. Furthermore, some valid payday
loans made over a decade ago remain. Collectors do not want
to write-off these debts simply because the statute of
limitations has run. This is why solely regulating payday
lending will not solve the problem because such regulation
does not address the harassing and illegal tactics currently
employed in WNY collection agencies.136
130. See id. (admitting that the collector-informant “knew it was wrong, but it
was all about the money”).
131. See Cuomo Press Release, supra note 9.
132. See FTC. v. Vantage Point Servs., LLC, No. 15-CV-6S, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 111084, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017); Pfeiffer, supra note 8.
133. See generally Creola Johnson, Congress Protected the Troops: Can the
New CFPB Protect Civilians from Payday Lending?, 69 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 649
(2012); Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?,
87 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2002).
134. See Burden, supra note 37 (indicating that modern credit availability will
subject new debts and types of debtors to collections).
135. See id.; Kocis, supra note 73.
136. CFPB Supp., supra note 42, at 79–99 (finding that certain states’ efforts
to reduce consumer access to payday loans were unsuccessful and, ultimately, did
not affect stores’ revenue).
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III. ISSUES & ILLEGAL PRACTICES
While the collection crisis in WNY affects various forms
of consumer debt, the majority consists of credit card and
payday loan debt.137 Payday loans are most appealing to
members of society with the fewest resources.138 Without
sufficient due diligence as to a consumers’ credit-worthiness,
payday lenders dangle a carrot of liquid capital just large
enough to lure helpless, desperate, and often uninformed
consumers into chasing a short-term sense of financial
stability.139 That feeling erodes quickly once the loan’s short
fixed-term is up,140 and the creditor demands repayment at
an incredibly high interest rate.141
Sadly, these schemes target financially distressed
consumers.142 Lenders take advantage of those in the lowest
socioeconomic class, who correspondingly are the least
educated.143 One report noted that Americans with the
lowest net worth have the highest amount of outstanding
credit card debt.144 While these lending practices are morally
disgraceful, the reprehensible and predatory strategies
collection agencies’ employ are arguably worse because they
are designed to prey on the debtors’ assumed ignorance of the

137. See Plummer v. Atl. Credit & Fin., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 484, 484–88
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). See generally CFPB Database, supra note 126.
138. CFPB Supp., supra note 42, at 74–76. See Gold v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,
Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1075–76 (N. D. Cal 2015) (defining the “least
sophisticated” consumer that the FDCPA seeks to protect).
139. Chin, supra note 41, at 723–25. See also ASAC Sibley Interview, supra
note 127.
140. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 13–14.
141. Chin, supra note 41, at 724. See also Keest & Renuart, supra note 43, at
55.
142. Chin, supra note 41, at 727–28.
143. See id. at 728.
144. Frankel, supra note 34 (finding the average credit card debt among those
with a negative or zero-net-worth is $10,307, which is 27% higher than the group
with the next highest average).
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law and fear of arrest or civil liability.145
Collectors also appear to lack any moral compass as
evidenced by their wrongful collection attempts. They siphon
every possible cent out of debtors without regard to other
necessities.146 Many complaints documented by the FTC’s
and Consumer Finance Protection Bureau’s (CFPB)
complaint databases tell heart-wrenching stories. For
example, elderly consumers complain of having to choose
between purchasing their prescription medications or paying
the collectors.147 Examples like this are common but appear
with the highest concentration in WNY.148
Exacerbating these predatory tactics, once a debtor pays,
collectors target them because they know “that debtor will
continue paying.” What follows is a cyclical pattern where
debtors forego critical necessities, electing to pay collectors
instead, just to stop the harassment. In return, collectors
give debtors a brief reprieve before collections begin anew,
and the process repeats itself.149
Collectors do everything in their power to foster a sense
of panic and urgency in debtors.150 This inevitably clouds the

145. Johnson, supra note 21, at 13–28 (discussing predatory tactics employed
when collecting from economically distressed individuals). See also Chin, supra
note 41, at 727–28.
146. Johnson, supra note 21, at 31–35.
147. Johnson, supra note 21, at 35–36; Davis Interview, supra note 7.
148. See Fairbanks, supra note 1 (“‘Buffalo is ground zero for debt collection
companies that routinely violate state and federal debt collection laws,’ . . . [t]he
debt collection industry has a long history here and Morrissey suspects the bad
eggs learned the trade from legitimate collectors before going out on their own,”
(quoting Assistant Attorney General James M. Morrissey)).
149. See CFPB Supp., supra note 42, at 100–05; Press Release, Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau, (July 10, 2014), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-ace-cash-express-for-pushing-paydayborrowers-into-cycle-of-debt/ [hereinafter CFPB Press Release] (attaching “[t]he
ACE cycle-of-debt training manual graphic,” which shows how ACE designed
their business model to trap consumers in a “cycle-of-debt”); Fairbanks, supra
note 128; Davis Interview, supra note 7.
150. CFPB Press Release, supra note 149.
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debtors’ judgment, which is precisely the collectors’ intent.
Unable to think rationally, tunnel vision precludes debtors
from noticing any otherwise obvious “red flags.”151 Any
reluctance is met with offensive, aggressive, and accusatory
responses from the collector.152 Aggressive tactics and insults
directed at the debtor are designed to confuse them into
believing the collector’s legitimacy; to most, the contradictory
nature of this approach is only obvious retrospectively.153
As previously discussed, collectors specifically target
society’s lower socioeconomic classes because they are
typically the least educated.154 Preying on less educated or
elderly individuals allows collectors to employ flagrantly
illegal tactics because these individuals are least likely to
know collection laws or how the legal system functions.155
Most importantly, these debtors do not realize the distinction
between civil and criminal actions;156 they do not know that
non-payment of debts is not a criminal offense.157
Fearing criminal prosecution, debtors will do anything
and everything they can to locate funds.158 Many have
families to support, and they fear that their children will be
taken away if they are convicted of a criminal offense.159 This

151. See Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 3.
152. See, e.g., id. at 2.
153. Cf. id. (highlighting the consumer’s confusion and initial reaction to the
collector, which was not to question the debt but instead try to avoid going to
prison).
154. Chin, supra note 41, at 727–28.
155. See id; Burden, supra note 37. See generally Johnson, supra note 23
(describing how collectors tailor their schemes to prey on the most vulnerable
consumers).
156. See Informant Interview, supra note 120; Johnson, supra note 23, at 5–6.
157. Johnson, supra note 23, at 5–6.
158. See, e.g., Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 1–3; Johnson, supra note 23, at
29–40.
159. See Johnson, supra note 23, at 29–40 (arguing that women are
disproportionally affected when subjected to predatory collection tactics).
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belief directly results from the collector’s statements.160 Of
course, none of these statements are true, and they all violate
the FDCPA.161 Even if they don’t whole-heartedly believe the
threats, uneducated and unsuspecting debtors might
conclude that they should pay anyway to ease their fears.162
The following two egregious examples illustrate the extent to
which collectors engage in repulsive conduct.
The first example demonstrates the despicable manner
in which collectors talk to debtors. In this case, a debtor
recorded a collector threatening to rape her minor daughter
if she did not pay the alleged balance—despite the debtor’s
insistence that she had no outstanding debt.163 This threat is
more than just reprehensible—it is a felony offense in New
York State.164 Collectors have demonstrated equal cruelty in
their harassing tactics.
A second heart-wrenching example involves a collector
who continually harassed an elderly gentleman immediately
after the death of his wife.165 Tragically, this poor man woke
up to find his wife had passed away during the night.166 In
the midst of arranging for the coroner to remove his wife’s
body, and while awaiting a return call from the coroner, a

160. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 35–48; Earls Decl., supra note 104,
at 1.
161. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2010); Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 47.
162. See Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 1–3.
163. Alex Henderson, ‘Am I Going to Have to Kill You?’ ALTERNET (April 17,
2011), https://www.alternet.org/story/150638/%27am_i_going_to_have_to_kill_
you%27%3A_the_horrific_ways_abusive_debt_collectors_threaten_and_harass_t
heir_victims.
164. A person is guilty of First Degree Coercion under New York law if they
compel or induce another to engage in conduct that they have a right to abstain
from “by instilling in the victim a fear that he or she will cause physical injury to
a person.” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.65.
165. Pls. Complaint and attached audio recordings (on file with author), FTC
v. 4 Star Resolution, LLC, No. 15-CV-112S, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40597
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015).
166. Id.
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collector called demanding payment.167 To no avail, this grief
stricken man pleaded with the collector to allow him a few
hours to deal with the situation.168 The collector steadfastly
refused to postpone his collection attempt. Instead, despite
the man’s sobs and pleas, this collector continuously kept
soliciting payment.169
Attempting to capitalize on the debtor’s grief this
collector taunted the man saying things such as: “your wife
would’ve wanted you to take care of this—it’s the right thing
to do,” and “I don’t want to have to call you again.”170 The
collector’s continuous calls did not cease until the man’s
probation officer validated his claims.171 While this
demonstrates an unfathomable dearth of compassion and
morality, these examples don’t reveal the fraudulent
conspiracy underlying this scheme.
A. “Double Banging”
“Predatory,” “threatening,” and “harassing” are terms
that barely scratch the surface of illegal conduct in which
WNY collectors engage. Arguably the most shocking practice
is collecting on “re-dos”—also known as “double banging”—
which means that the same agency collects on a single debt
multiple times.172 In the most heinous examples, double
collection attempts occur while the debtor is still making
installment payments on the first attempt.173 While regular
monitoring of credit reports would likely inform consumers
whether collectors’ demands are valid, unsophisticated
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT:
CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2016 16–20, 28–29 (2016); Fairbanks, supra note 128.
173. See, e.g., Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 3–4 (describing a collector’s
repeated calls in attempt to solicit additional money from a consumer).
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consumers are unlikely to do so. Instead, when threatened,
often these debtors simply pay.174
Unfortunately for those who presumably believe that
paying will stop the agency’s collection efforts, they’ve just
made themselves targets.175 Counterintuitively for an
honest, well-intentioned debtor, making payments actually
places a sign on his back that says: “I’m easily intimidated,
and will pay.” These are precisely the people collectors want
to identify.176 Once identified, collectors will “double bang”
consumers who pay by engaging in the same tactics that they
did the first time.177
To do so, on subsequent collection attempts, collectors
merely represent themselves as a different agency.178 In fact,
the same techniques that agencies employ to mask their
illegal conduct from law enforcement also enables collectors
to “double bang” debtors.179
Collectors frequently misrepresent themselves and their
agency’s real name over the phone. They do this primarily
because it further insulates them from their illegal collection
tactics. But a secondary benefit is that varying their agency’s
name facilitates double-banging. Collectors must use a
different agency name when re-collecting a debt, but agency
names are easily fabricated over the phone. Moreover,
agency owners and managers frequently “stash” registered
LLCs and d/b/a names so that the agency name reported to
the Better Business Bureau (BBB), FTC, or New York
Attorney General (NYAG) does not match the name given to
debtors.180
174. E.g., id. at 1–3.
175. See, e.g., Informant Interview, supra note 120.
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 51 (listing eight different company
names that a single agency used when contacting consumers).
179. See id.; Informant Interview, supra note 120.
180. See Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 13–16. See also, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note
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They do this to prepare for the point at which the name
they are using generates a substantial number of complaints;
they then inevitably switch to a clean name.181 Having these
alternative agency names at their disposal is what allows
collectors to collect from the same debtor multiple times.182
Similarly, collectors often change their phone numbers
for largely the same reasons that they change the company
name.183 Thus, anytime they change their name and phone
number it is as if they have just acquired a new portfolio to
work, except that this portfolio exclusively consists of
“debtors” whom they know are susceptible to their predatory
tactics. In this scenario, slightly tweaking their talk-off
script, method of payment demanded, or varying their
payment accounts sufficiently blinds debtors to the fraud
perpetrated against them.184
To clarify, not every agency engages in double banging,
but the practice is by no means rare.185 Moreover, because
paper is placed, traded, bought, and sold so frequently, even
agencies attempting to follow the laws may inadvertently
engage in double banging.186 As previously noted, many
shops will sell “bad paper”—meaning portfolios that they
have already worked—thus rendering validation impossible
and double collection attempts inevitable.187
1, at 29–39.
181. Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 13–16. See also, supra note 105 and
accompanying text; Informant Interview, supra note 120.
182. See Davis Decl., supra note 105, at 23 tbl.10.
183. See Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 22–29.
184. Informant Interview, supra note 120.
185. Cf. Fairbanks, supra note 128.
186. Informant Interview, supra note 120.
187. Baumann, supra note 77 (“One other huge problem is there’s no system in
place for tracking who owns these debts. Imagine a system where there’s no chain
of titles for cars, no VIN numbers, and no DMV. There’d be total chaos!”); Faux,
supra note 113 (“Therrien had been caught up in a fraud known as phantom debt,
where millions of Americans are hassled to pay back money they don’t owe . . . It
begins when someone scoops up troves of personal information that are available
cheaply online—old loan applications, long-expired obligations, data from hacked
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Notably, not all collectors who engage in this practice are
culpable. Collection agency managers can “scrub” the
portfolio—essentially clear all previously entered collector
notes—and then assign it to a collector who unknowingly
double bangs the debtor.188 Similarly, rather than scrubbing
paper, they can also “scramble” the portfolio.189 Functionally,
scrambling is no different than scrubbing; it differs to the
extent that scrubbing involves reassigning each debt to a
different debtor as opposed clearing any information
regarding collections.190
Collectors are effective at “talking-off” debtors’
concerns.191 They convincingly insist that they know nothing
about any prior collection attempts and fervently reiterate
that the only way they can “help” is to stop the pending legal
action—which they can only do after the “debtor” pays.192
At their inception, many of these methods began out of
necessity rather than willful attempts to defraud debtors. As
collection agencies began to amass mountains of complaints
against them, apprehensive creditors started refusing to
place or sell paper in WNY. This, in and of itself, should
demonstrate how pervasive unlawful collection tactics are in
the region.193 Unable to find paper for their collectors to
work, owners sought new ways to continue collecting; thus,
they devised the double bang.194 While borne out of necessity,
owners struck gold in devising the notion of double banging
debtors as opposed to seeking out and purchasing new

accounts—and reformats it to look like a list of debts. Then they make deals with
unscrupulous collectors who will demand repayment of the fictitious bills”).
188. Id.; Davis Interview, supra note 7.
189. Informant Interview, supra note 120.
190. See id.
191. See JAKE HALPERN, BAD PAPER: CHASING DEBT FROM WALL STREET TO THE
UNDERWORLD 15 (2014).
192. See e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 36–60.
193. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127; Davis Interview, supra note 7.
194. See, e.g., Pfeiffer, supra note 8.
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debt.195
The scheme is the gift that keeps on giving; collectors can
recover far more than a debt’s face value while eliminating
the debt scarcity problem. Not only does this approach yield
greater gross income—it costs nothing. Double banging
creates a seemingly untamable beast that employees must
continually feed to get paid.196 In this way, collectors become
slaves to the beast. They cannot stop collecting because they
depend on their paychecks; therefore, when paper is scarce,
the only option for collectors is to “double bang.”197
In the worst collection agencies, informants revealed
that, not only is this practice commonplace, but it’s repeated
as often as possible. Collectors are known to double bang
debtors currently making installment payments on their own
previous collection attempt.198 Sadly, because of tactics like
this, there are victims to this fraudulent scheme who pay
collectors more than ten times the principal amount actually
“owed.”199
Rarely does a debtor’s principal balance exceed a few
hundred dollars.200 Yet, in the worst cases, victims paid over
$10,000 to satisfy a single debt amounting to a mere fraction
of that.201 Instead of feeling guilt or empathy, however,
collectors mock these victims. Evidence uncovered in some of
these agencies includes collectors’ notes showing blatant

195. See, e.g., Davis Decl., supra note 105, at 2–19 tbl.1–7.
196. Informant Interview, supra note 120.
197. See id; HALPERN, supra note 191, at 57–58; Davis Interview, supra note 7;
Fairbanks, supra note 1; infra text accompanying note 268.
198. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127; Davis Interview, supra note 7.
199. See Davis Interview, supra note 7 (noting, once again, that many debts
collected are illegal to collect on in the first place).
200. Payday loan debts typically range from $100–$800; however, debtors
sometimes pay thousands of dollars to “satisfy” the same debt multiple times. See
Informant Interview, supra note 120.
201. Davis Interview, supra note 7. Cf. supra notes 41–51 and accompanying
text (referencing the pitfalls attending high-interest lending models).
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amusement that they got prior victims to re-pay.202
Appallingly, many of these collectors seem to actually take
pride in their ability to continuously elicit payments from
victims.203
B. Dealing “PiFs” & Lead Sheets
For WNY collection agencies, attempts to collect on
illegitimate debts do not stop at double banging. Many
collectors will continue to work recalled paper, or
alternatively, intentionally sell bad paper, and this practice
is rapidly increasing.204 There are agencies now that deal
exclusively in accounts already “paid in full” (PiFs).205 They
trade PiFs like kids trade baseball cards.206 Instead of
purchasing new debt or paying a commission for collections,
they simply swap PiF accounts with other agencies. This
practice is as deplorable as it is fraudulent. Agencies
exclusively collecting on PiF paper inherently make zero
valid collection attempts because there are no valid debts to
collect—like re-do’s, they have already been collected.
At these type of agencies, collectors’ claims to consumers
are patently false. A collector “unaware” of prior payments
or collection attempts for the debt they are currently
attempting to collect may very well be the same debt the
debtor already paid.207 It is true that sometimes collectors do

202. Davis Interview, supra note 7. Cf. Davis Decl., supra note 105, at 29–36
(describing documents uncovered pursuant to an immediate access search of a
collection agency office space where law enforcement officials found these notes
on collectors’ desks).
203. The “pride” many collectors feel does not necessarily stem from causing
debtors to panic, but rather from the collectors’ ability to receive a paycheck for
effective double banging, See Informant Interview, supra note 120.
204. See, e.g., HALPERN, supra note 191, at 3–7.
205. See, e.g., Informant Interview, supra note 120.
206. Id. See also supra notes 61–76 and accompanying text (describing the
complications that arise with securitization and commercial resale of accounts
receivable).
207. See Informant Interview, supra note 120.
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not “know” any details regarding prior payments or
collections, but because the details are documented on the
collection software (unless someone scrubbed the paper),
surely they realize that the current attempt is illegitimate.208
Collectors get equal commission bonuses for legitimate and
illegitimate collections which incentivizes fervent collection
attempts without regard to the debt’s legitimacy.209
Recently,
multiple
agencies
began
generating
complaints concerning payday loan collection attempts
against “debtors” who never applied for—much less took
out—a payday loan.210 This phenomenon results from the
dealing of so called “lead sheets.”211 Anyone researching
payday loans is first prompted to enter their personal
information before accessing any information.212 Even if that
individual elects not to take a loan, which often happens due
to the usurious terms, the information that the prospective
debtor provided is recorded.213 It is precisely this information
that is compiled into lead sheets.
Collectors soon realized that these lead sheets are as
good, if not better, than actual paper. Working lead sheets
allows collectors to maintain the sense of urgency they create
simply by insisting that the consumer can plead his case to a

208. Id.
209. See id. Cf. HALPERN, supra note 191, at 14.
210. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 27–60. See also Davis Interview,
supra note 7.
211. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127.
212. Cf. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU TO OVERSEE DEBT COLLECTION MARKET 1,
https://files.consumer
finance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_debt-collection-factsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 2012)
[hereinafter Debt Collections Fact Sheet] (“Examiners will assess whether debt
collectors are using accurate data in their pursuit of debt. Inaccurate information
can lead to collectors attempting to collect debt that consumers do not owe or
have already paid.”).
213. See e.g., Johnson, supra note 23, at 25–28; Press Release, N.Y. State Dep’t.
of Fin. Servs., DFS Announces Settlement with Two Debt Buyers Resulting in $3
Million of Restitution to Thousands of New York Consumers (May 18, 2016),
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/prl605181.html.
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judge during ensuing legal proceedings, which they insist are
inevitable if the debtor does not pay.214
Armed with premeditated, somewhat rational, talking
points, collectors can generate nearly equivalent revenue
collecting off lead-sheets as they could working legitimate
debt.215 Once again, they rely heavily on debtors’ assumed
ignorance, thus rendering this practice not only possible, but
profitable.216 What is more, lead-sheets are commonly
bought and sold just like debt portfolios in WNY,217 once
again, demonstrating collectors’ immunity to debt scarcity—
who needs to buy legitimate debt when it can be conjured out
of thin air?
The scariest aspect of this development, at least for the
individuals who appear on these sheets, is the extent to
which their information is distributed. Consumers have no
way of knowing who will eventually access their information,
or for what purpose.218
Between “double banging” debtors, dealing in “PiFs,” and
working lead-sheets, it is clear that, under the veil of
“collections,” WNY agencies devised a well-orchestrated
scam designed to defraud consumers across the country. The
critical difference between these operations and other scams
is that these collectors shroud fraudulent activity as
legitimate employment.219 In this way, WNY collectors slip
through the cracks while authorities concentrate on higher
profile, well-known scams, which in turn allows collectors to
hide in plain sight.220
214. See Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 7.
215. Cf. HALPERN, supra note 191, at 14 (discussing collectors who were
“masterful at the ‘talk-off,’” that collectors use to “encourage, shame, and
intimidate [debtors] into paying.”).
216. See id.
217. See Davis Interview, supra note 7; Johnson, supra note 23, at 25–28.
218. See Johnson, supra note 23, at 25–28.
219. But see Debt Collection Fact Sheet, supra note 212, at 1.
220. See HALPERN, supra note 191, at 12–13 (“These were folks that you
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C. Specific FDCPA Violations
Overall, the FDCPA does not impose a substantial
burden for legally compliant collection agencies.221 There are
nuanced provisions, but in general, the FDCPA simply
mandates that collectors act honestly,222 refrain from
harassment,223 and interact with debtors in a professional
manner.224 The statute is fairly summarized as outlawing
collectors from making any misrepresentations as to their
purpose for contacting a debtor.225 These are not difficult or
burdensome requirements, but simply expected as a matter
of professional courtesy in the vast majority of occupations.
Parties to valid contracts are bound by an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.226 The securitization
process, in theory, eliminates the privity upon which this
implied covenant is founded because the creditor sells the
debtor’s obligation to repay.227 On the other hand, collection
bumped into at the grocery store, but there wasn’t a whole lot of interaction
because Buffalo is very stratified.”).
221. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq.
(2010); Ruth v. Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790, 800–04 (7th Cir. 2009) (discussing
unsophisticated consumers, and describing various FDCPA violations, their
elements, and presumptions).
222. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e–1692f (2010) (prohibiting collectors from overstating
the balance owed, adding fees, interest, or other expenses not specified in the
original contract, or threatening action that the collectors have no intention or no
authority to take). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1342 (2017) (criminalizing the use of a
fictitious name in the furtherance of fraud or unlawful business).
223. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.
224. Id. § 1692c.
225. Ruth, 577 F.3d at 797–800 (requiring extrinsic evidence to establish
whether the communication has the tendency to mislead an unsophisticated
consumer.); Gold v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1071 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (noting the purpose and goals of the FDCPA).
226. See Anserphone, Inc. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 955 F. Supp. 418, 431 (W.D. Pa.
1996) (“A claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a species of
a contract claim.”).
227. See supra notes 52–60, 72–74 and accompanying text (highlighting the
securitization process and how “creditors” are distinguished from “collectors”—
the former being privy to the agreement and its obligations while the latter is
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agencies tacitly assume this duty when acquiring a creditor’s
contractual rights, but they are sufficiently removed from the
debtor to ignore it without consequence. Thus, the
misrepresentations collectors make to debtors violate this
implicit obligation, which alone is sufficient grounds for
voiding the debtor’s obligation to repay arising from the
obligation.228
Under the FDCPA, collectors are required to provide a
“mini-Miranda” disclaimer stating that they are contacting
the debtor in an attempt to collect on a debt, and any
information gathered will be used for that purpose.229
Additionally, debtors are entitled to receive verification of
the debt in writing from the collector.230 The logical rationale
for this requirement is that individuals who dispute a debt’s
validity are assured of it prior to paying an unknown agency.
The burden collectors face complying with the verification
and disclaimer requirements is minimal. Unsurprisingly,
however, rogue agencies in WNY routinely fail to comply
with even minimal statutory requirements.231 Far too often,
collectors are unable to verify the debt, which explains
collectors’ wholesale disregard for minimal statutory
mandates.232

not).
228. Cf. Desantis v. Roz-Ber, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 244, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
(highlighting that the FDCPA seeks to impose strict liability for violations, unless
the collector can demonstrate the existence of a bona fide error, and a “single
violation of the Act” is sufficient to impose liability).
229. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11); Drolet v. Phillips Reinhard & Assocs., No. 14CV-406-JTC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19754, at *4 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2016)
(“Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant’s debt collection activity violated
sections . . . 1692e(11) (prohibiting a debt collector from failing to disclose “miniMiranda” warning)”); Elwin Griffith, The Role of Validation and Communication
in the Debt Collection Process, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 429, 456 n.153 (2010).
230. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (requiring proper written notice within five days of the
initial communication).
231. Drolet, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19754, at *3–4 n.1; HALPERN, supra note
191, at 89–113.
232. See, e.g., Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 26–27.
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Congress mandated these requirements to ensure equity
and to allow consumers an opportunity to dispute invalid
debts.233 Holding a consumer liable for an invalid debt
unquestionably contravenes equitable bargaining principles
and undermines congressional intent.234 Collectors in rogue
agencies, however, thrive on inequity to elevate their
position relative to the consumer and compel payment.235
Thus, to avoid sending verification notices to debtors,
collectors create justifications and conjure exigent
circumstances rendering verification impossible.236 This is
because, to bolster the appearance of exigency, collectors
misrepresent themselves and their principal to appear as if
they are a law enforcement agency located within the
debtor’s jurisdiction.237
Call “spoofing” technology allows collectors to falsify
their area codes and the name appearing on the debtor’s
caller ID.238 Debtors located in Texas or Florida, for example,
are apt to realize the collector’s illegitimacy if the caller’s
area code originates in WNY. Even an “unsophisticated
consumer” who noticed this discrepancy would second-guess
the collector’s legitimacy.239 Therefore, collectors use

233. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (“[c]ongressional findings and declaration of
purpose”).
234. See id.
235. See, e.g., HALPERN, supra note 191, at 14; Johnson, supra note 23, at 42–
47.
236. Cf. Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 35–55.
237. See ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127.
238. Describing the importance of technology in facilitating debt collectors’
fraudulent scheme, ASAC Sibley stated that technology makes illegal debt
collection possible because consumers tend to believe information conveyed by
their caller ID, especially when the collector feigns authority and they have no
reason to think otherwise. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127. See also, e.g.,
Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 5–6.
239. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) 15 U.S.C. § 1692e
(prohibiting false or misleading statements, which does not preclude collectors’
making material misrepresentations using various technology). See also, e.g., Pls.
MSJ, supra note 3.
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technology to eliminate this discrepancy and appear as if
they have legitimate legal authority.
The FDCPA also limits when collectors can contact
debtors’ family or friends and what information they can
disclose.240 Similarly, the FDCPA prohibits collectors from
harassing either debtors or third parties.241 Once again,
WNY collection agencies rarely comply with these
mandates.242
Should collectors’ attempts to intimidate debtors into
paying prove unsuccessful, harassment provides an
alternative means through which to compel payment.243
Many consumers who dispute the debt, or are otherwise
unmotivated by collectors’ threats, eventually elect to pay
anyway merely to alleviate collectors harassing themselves,
loved ones, or employers.244 Moreover, disclosure limitations
are intended to stop collectors from purposely attempting to
embarrass the consumer or adversely influence opinions of
their friends, family, or employer.245 When these regulations
are unenforced, many consumers reach the point where
paying is less costly than dealing with constant harassment.
The cost of harassment goes beyond merely the cost of
enduring it; collectors will purposely harass a debtor’s
employer, and potentially jeopardize the debtor’s
240. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.
241. Id. §§ 1692c(b), 1692d.
242. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 27–60; Press Release, N.Y. State
Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces $165k Settlement
with Debt Collector in Buffalo (Nov. 21, 2013), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/agschneiderman-announces-165k-settlement-debt-collector-buffalo.
[hereinafter
NYAG Press Release].
243. See, e.g., Fajer v. Kaufman, Burns & Assocs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8338,
at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2011) (awarding $500 where defendant made numerous
calls to home and workplace and made empty threats of litigation); Hance v.
Premier Recovery Grp., Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2161, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan.
7, 2013) (awarding $500 in statutory damages where defendant called plaintiff’s
home on a number of occasions, totaling more than 20 times per month).
244. See e.g., Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 1–2.
245. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b, 1692c(b), 1692d.
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employment.246 This is a calculated and effective tactic for
collectors because, as noted above, individuals most
susceptible to taking payday loans, or amassing substantial
credit card debt, are precisely the type who cannot afford to
lose their job.247 This situation exemplifies the rationale for
prohibiting such collection tactics, which congress sought to
do by enacting the FDCPA.248 Unfortunately, these statutory
prohibitions are meaningless absent effective enforcement.
D. Threats to Arrest
As previously mentioned, another egregious FDCPA
violation that collectors frequently employ is threatening the
debtor with arrest and subsequent criminal prosecution.249
Threats such as these are not anomalies nor are they merely
practices in which a few rogue employees engage to boost
their commissions; they are incorporated into scripts that
collectors are specifically directed to use when leaving
messages for the debtor.250 One agency used the same script
consistently enough that law enforcement began to identify
various assumed company names the agency used by
comparing nearly identical consumer complaints attributed
to “different” agencies.251 There, collectors told every debtor

246. See Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 57–59; Davis Interview, supra note 7.
247. See Chin, supra note 41, at 726–27.
248. See Gold v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1071 (N. D.
Cal 2015) (quoting Kasalo v. Trident Asset Mgmt., LLC, 53 F. Supp. 3d 1072,
1078 (N.D. Ill (2014)).
249. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(3) (Prohibiting “[t]he solicitation by a debt collector
of any postdated check or other postdated payment instrument for the purpose of
threatening or instituting criminal prosecution.”). See generally Johnson, supra
note 23 (describing how prevalent criminalization tactics are in the debt
collection industry and why they are effective— especially when made to women).
250. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 29–33, 35–48. See also Patrice
Hendriksen, CFPB and NY AG File Joint Lawsuit Against Debt Collectors,
CONSUMER
FINANCE
ENFORCEMENT
WATCH
(Nov.
4,
2016),
http://www.enforcementwatch.com/2016/11/04/cfpb-and-ny-ag-file-joint-lawsuitagainst-debt-collectors/
251. See, e.g., Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 13–16. See also supra note 107 and
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that creditors retained their company to file a “two-part
felony complaint for federal check (or wire) fraud.”252 They
then bolstered this threat by convincing the debtor that
officers would “pick [them] up” for these charges that day,
sometimes within mere hours.253 Fortunately for debtors, or
so they are told, they can avoid arrest and criminal
prosecution if they obtain a “court release number.”254 This
will issue, however, only after the debtor pays.
The frequency of these threats is astonishing. In one
case, out of one hundred randomly sampled audio recordings,
the NYAG identified eighty calls explicitly containing a false
representation.255 This means that within a “95% confidence
interval for the frequency of false representations in calls
lasting 40 seconds or greater,” 70.9% to 87.3% of calls
contained a false representation.256 Within the same sample,
collectors explicitly threatened arrest or detainment in fiftytwo of these calls. 257 This amounts to a frequency of 41.8%
to 62.1% calls containing threats to arrest or detain within a
95% confidence interval.258
Employing such a tactic places a strict temporal
limitation on a debtor’s payment, which creates a sense of
urgency. This renders debtors susceptible to believing
collectors when they are told that there is not enough time to
validate the debt.259 Likewise, debtors believe that they do
not have time to research the company’s legitimacy nor the

accompanying text (referencing call-spoofing technology and how its employed in
the debt collection industry).
252. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 48–55.
253. Id. at 42.
254. See, e.g., id.
255. Id. at 59.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 59–60.
259. See id. at 35–42 (demonstrating the short amount of time that collectors
tell debtors they have to resolve the dispute before charges will be filed).
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charges cited by the collector; they are focused on gathering
sufficient funds to pay and avoid arrest.
Even a cursory reflection on the purported charges in
many cases would reveal the collection attempt’s fraudulent
nature.260 For example, one agency alleged that they
intended to file a criminal complaint for soliciting incorrect
information.261 The “charge” itself is both nonsensical and
oxymoronic. How would one even attempt to solicit incorrect
information? Providing incorrect information in an attempt
to defraud another, of course, is a requisite element of
common law fraud,262 but it does not follow that someone
could intentionally solicit the same in an attempt to defraud
another. Yet, partially due to the debtor’s ignorance of the
law and partially out of fear of arrest, many victims fail to
notice this inherent contradiction.263
This tactic is most repulsive when contacting consumers
who do not have any outstanding debt. On the other hand,
the more suspect the debt, the more aggressive the tactics
and threats collectors employ to collect it.264 When collecting
legitimate debts, legitimate collectors have legal remedies
available, which gives them an incentive not to forfeit these
remedies by engaging in illegal tactics.265 On the other hand,
if the debt is illegitimate, collectors have nothing to lose; they
see only greater commissions when threatening to arrest
debtors who otherwise would have no incentive to pay a debt

260. See, e.g., id. at 35–47.
261. Cf. id. at 35–47, 52–54.
262. Banque Arabe Et Internationale D’Investissement v. Md. Nat’l Bank, 57
F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir. 1995) (“To prove common law fraud under New York law,
a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant made a material false representation,
(2) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff thereby, (3) the plaintiff
reasonably relied upon the representation, and (4) the plaintiff suffered damage
as a result of such reliance.”).
263. See, e.g., Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 1–3.
264. See, e.g., HALPERN, supra note 191, at 14; Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 35–
55.
265. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
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that they legitimately do not owe.266
E. Collectors Representing Themselves as “Attorneys,”
“Investigators,” or Law Enforcement Officials
Attempting to substantiate their threats to arrest a
debtor, frequently on imaginary charges, collectors must also
misrepresent their authority to bring such charges.267 Thus,
collectors falsely identify themselves as attorneys, local law
enforcement officers, or federal agents to establish a
presumption of legitimacy.268 Using different area codes and
call spoofing technology enables collectors to maintain their
apparent legitimacy.269 When collectors spoof calls the
recipient’s caller ID, in addition to misrepresenting the area
code, they can also misrepresent the organization from which
the call originates.270 For debtors, it appears as if they are
receiving a call from a law enforcement agency or district
attorney’s office.271 This misrepresentation is reinforced
when the caller’s area code matches that of the debtor’s. This
is why collectors maintain an overabundance of phone
numbers with different area codes or employ call spoofing
technology.272
When a debtor calls back into the live server, they
answer as if they are a “legal processing” or law firm, which,
of course, is patently false.273 Recently, one WNY agency
went as far as representing itself as an agent of the NYAG;
presumably in an attempt to delegitimize the organization,

266. Informant Interview, supra note 120.
267. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 29–33, 35–60.
268. See, e.g., id.
269. See, e.g., id. at 30–31, 33.
270. E.g., id. at 30, 33.
271. E.g., id. at 30–31.
272. See, e.g., id.
273. See, e.g., id. at 35–60.
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and to illicit fear in the debtor.274 The NYAG has recovered
a majority of the restitution payments pursuant to
judgments obtained in WNY for unlawful collections.275
Fortunately for debtors, this idea backfired. Collectors’
misrepresentations caused three separate debtors to
inadvertently call the real NYAG’s office, who then used
their statements as evidence of the collections agency’s
wrongful conduct.276
Not only does the FDCPA prohibit misrepresentations
such as these, but it also prohibits collectors from
threatening any action that they cannot, or do not, actually
intend to take.277 Obviously, collectors lack any authority to
carry out the threatened actions, especially where there is no
valid underlying debt. Rather, these collectors are typically
the type who are otherwise unemployable in any legitimate
business.
1. Who Collectors Really Are
In reality, a majority of WNY collectors are degenerates,
gang-bangers, and/or ex-convicts, which makes them perfect
for the industry.278 Individuals who lack any sense of
morality or compassion are exactly the type who thrive in
collections.279 The industry attracts those who have no
qualms about breaking the law.280 An entrepreneur starting
his own collection agency described the types of employees
274. See Davis Interview, supra note 7.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) provides:
A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without
limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct
is a violation of this section . . . [t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.
278. See HALPERN, supra note 191, at 13.
279. See id.
280. See id.
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he wanted to attract as “ex-cons, drug addicts, twentysomethings without high school diplomas, and a variety of
other hard-luck cases . . . [because] the more clean-cut types
simply wouldn’t get the job done.”281 Especially in the case of
ex-convicts, who are precisely the people who require
documentation verifying that they are meaningfully
employed to show their parole or probation officers, it is no
wonder why these employees are the best “hustlers.” 282
Because the industry and its attending illegal practices go
largely unnoticed, post-release supervision officers have no
way of recognizing the difference between “telemarketing,”
and fraudulent debt collection, allowing collectors to slip
through the cracks.283
Given the type of individuals attracted to this industry,
narcotics abuse within WNY collection agencies is
pervasive.284
NYAG
investigators,
while
working
undercover, have observed collectors using marijuana,
cocaine, and everything in between at work.285 Evidence
indicated that some employees even injected heroin in the
office.286 Substance abuse in these agencies is so pervasive
and severe that NYAG investigators witnessed collectors
“huffing” magic markers at work to ease withdrawal
symptoms.287 Pervasive substance abuse helps explain the
utter lack of morality common among WNY collectors; they
will do anything to make money to feed their habits,
especially when disguised as legitimate employment.
Additionally, substance abuse problems provide insight

281. Id.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 12–13; Davis Interview, supra note 7.
284. See, e.g., HALPERN, supra note 191, at 13 (describing how a collection
agency manager “had to help break up a fight that began when a collector
overcharged his co-worker for a bag of cocaine.”).
285. See, e.g., id.; Davis Interview, supra note 7.
286. Davis Interview, supra note 7. See also HALPERN, supra note 191, at 13.
287. Davis Interview, supra note 7.
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as to why, despite millions of dollars flowing into these
agencies, collectors often attempt to unfreeze assets to pay
attorney’s fees when defending legal action against them.288
The NYAG’s Senior Consumer Frauds Representative for the
Buffalo Regional Office, Karen Davis, mockingly
summarized the prevalence of narcotics in the WNY
collection industry: “[i]t’s almost hard to tell if they are
laundering drug money through collections, or vice-versa;
laundering [illicit debt] collection proceeds through
drugs.”289 Not that collectors could actually “launder” money
through illicit means such as narcotic sales, but the point is
that illegitimately acquired funds are all converted to cash
and other property, which makes the proceeds difficult to
trace and recover.
If the collectors’ conduct described thus far is not
outrageous enough, fear not—it gets worse. A substantial
number of collectors receive government benefits such as
Medicaid and Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) subsidies.290
In reality, collectors are relatively well-compensated, yet
they not only avoid paying any income tax but actually
receive government benefits because their employer does not
accurately report their wages.291 Defrauding the government
is not exclusive to lower-level collectors; managers and even
some collection agency owners reap whatever government
benefits they can siphon from taxpayers.292
Given the callous examples of greed already addressed,
collection agency owners and managers fraudulently
receiving government benefits should come as no surprise.
288. See Fairbanks, supra note 1 (describing a Buffalo collector named Alan
Ceccarelli, who, during his sentencing hearing, pleaded guilty to wire fraud and
aggravated identity theft and “pointed to a decade-long addiction to cocaine,
heroin, and crack cocaine as the motivation for his crimes.”).
289. Davis Interview, supra note 7. See also HALPERN, supra note 191, at 12–
13; Fairbanks, supra note 1.
290. See, e.g., Pheiffer, supra note 7.
291. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127.
292. See, e.g., Pfeiffer, supra note 8.
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Surprising or not, it does not render the practice any less
outrageous. NYAG investigators uncovered evidence of
managers making over $100,000 per year while receiving
government subsidies.293 In one particularly egregious case,
an agency owner’s actual income exceeded $1,250,000 for a
single year, yet he still received Medicaid benefits—as did
the rest of his family.294
Since 2010, hundreds of millions of dollars have flowed
into WNY through these agencies.295 Collection agency
owners realized that it saved them money if employees filed
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax documents as
“independent contractors,” because this frees employees
from regular tax withholdings, allowing owners to
manipulate both business and personal tax documents.296
Moreover, employees are commonly paid in cash, or they
receive their paychecks from a separate, supposedly
unrelated, company, so that paychecks received are not
attributed to their employer’s payroll expenses.297 Many

293. Id.
294. Id. (describing a criminal action currently pending in the Western District
of New York, where, in addition to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, “[f]ederal
investigators also charged [Defendant] Ciffa with health care fraud” for engaging
“in a scheme to defraud Medicaid, which provides medical benefits for low-income
individuals.” On an application filed with the Department of Social Services,
“Ciffa claimed that he and his wife earned a combined income of $610 a week
[($31,720/year)].” According to federal prosecutors, in 2015, Ciffa, the “ringleader
of the conspiracy . . . had a total income of $1,284,951.04.”).
295. This figure represents a conservative estimate; the actual figure may
greatly exceed a billion dollars. Davis Interview, supra note 7. See also Davis
Decl., supra note 105, at 2–19; Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 84 (“Vantage Point’s
corporate bank account had deposits of at least $22,534,999.”); HALPERN, supra
note 191, at 15.
296. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FORM 1099-MISC & INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/help-resources/tools-faqs/faqsfor-individuals/frequently-asked-tax-questions-answers/small-business-selfemployed-other-business/form-1099-misc-independent-contractors/form-1099misc-independent-contractors (noting the difference between a Form W-2 and a
Form 1099-MISC).
297. See, e.g., Davis Decl., supra note 105, at 2–17 (outlining the regular
transfer of funds between purportedly “separate” entities).
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managers and employees stash wire transfer service and/or
money order accounts to ensure that their operation
continues when accounts are frozen or closed due to
chargebacks.298 Additionally, so that the money never stops
flowing, owners segregate their various business expenses so
that they are paid out of different accounts.299 They sweep
accounts almost daily so assets are not frozen, or if they are,
it is a small sum.300
F. “Over-BiFing”
The terminology in the industry for the principal balance
is referred to as the “balance in full” or “BiF.” Due to New
York’s usury laws, collectors are prohibited from collecting
usurious interest or fees over the principal debt.301 Thus,
especially when remitting commissions to the debt owner
when working placed debt, collecting the actual balance
yields noticeably smaller profits. To increase their bottom
line, WNY collectors responded by “over-BiFing”—
indiscriminately overstating the balance in full by including
amounts prohibited by law.302
This practice is flagrantly illegal.303 Over-BiFing is so
prevalent in WNY that many agencies categorically add
hundreds of dollars to the balance; inflating debts and
298. See, e.g., Pfeiffer, supra note 8 (“Collana was an associate of Ciffa who
established shell companies, payment processing accounts, and bank accounts, to
facilitate taking payments from individuals.”).
299. See Davis Decl., supra note 105, at 2–17; ASAC Sibley Interview, supra
note 127; Pfeiffer, supra note 8.
300. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127.
301. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501 (forbidding charging a usurious rate of
interest).
302. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(f)(1) (prohibiting “[t]he collection of any amount
(including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal
obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating
the debt or permitted by law.”); Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 27 (alleging Defendants
violated the FDCPA, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12), and N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349,
601(2)).
303. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(f)(1).
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collecting amounts debtors do not owe.304 The worst
offenders quote balances that exceed six-hundred percent of
the actual balance.305 What is more, this practice is not
limited to valid debts. Contradictory as it sounds, overBiFing occurs even when collectors know the underlying debt
is invalid.306 In almost every case, the arbitrary amount that
collectors add to the underlying debt, standing alone, violates
contemporary usury laws.
Besides the obvious appeal of increasing revenue, overBiFing serves another important purpose for rogue collection
agencies—it creates a cushion for collectors. This cushion
enables collectors to offer debtors the option of satisfying the
full balance—a “satisfaction in full”—by paying a sum lower
than the stated balance.307 The catch is that this satisfaction
amount is still higher than the actual balance, assuming an
actual balance even exists.308 This allows collectors to feign
sympathy for the debtor and insist that they are doing
everything they can to “help” by waiving or reducing fees.309
Convincingly, collectors engage in fictitious bartering that is,
in reality, not a bargain at all; it merely lessens the monetary
damages incurred by debtors—unless collectors decide to recollect the debt.310

304. See, e.g., Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB and New York
Attorney General File Lawsuit Against Illegal Nationwide Debt Collection
Scheme (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/
cfpb-and-new-york-attorney-general-file-lawsuit-against-illegal-nationwide-debt
-collection-scheme/ [hereinafter CFPB & NYAG Press Release].
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See Carbin v. N. Resolution Grp., LLC, No. 12-CV-1108JTC, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 126937, at *3–*5 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013).
308. See, e.g., id. at *2–*3 (“[P]laintiff obtained his credit report and saw that
defendant had reported an additional alleged debt of $850. He sent a written
communication disputing the debt and requesting validation. Defendant sent a
written communication in response, stating that the amount due was $1050, but
that it would waive interest and fees of $200 and accept payment in full of $850.”).
309. See id. See also supra note 165–171 and accompanying text
310. See Carbin, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126937, at *2–*3; Informant Interview,
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Similarly, collectors manifest their desire to “help”
victims by offering the option of paying in installments. Once
again, this is by no means a bargain. There is a caveat; the
aggregate sum of installment payments amounts to a higher
total than the already “over-BiFed” balance.311 This clever
tactic, manifested as a benefit to the debtor, actually helps
collectors maximize profits because the agency recovers more
than the full amount of the “debt” on top of any excess
already added in.312
Finally, this installment benefit is only available to
debtors who seem willing to pay but lack the funds and/or
any means to acquire them.313 Because impending criminal
prosecution is a commonly used threat against debtors, when
no such action is taken collectors’ misrepresentations become
readily apparent to debtors.314 Thus, offering installment
payments is the collectors’ last “hail-Mary” attempt at
recovery, in which case slowly siphoning the debtor’s money
is better than forfeiting their chances of recovery
altogether.315
G. Skip Tracing Services
Western New York collectors, like collectors elsewhere,
rely heavily on the use of skip-tracing services to locate
debtors; but because WNY agencies primarily collect old or
illegitimate debt, these services are critical to their
supra note 120.
311. See Carbin, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126937, at *1; CFPB & NYAG Press
Release, supra note 304.
312. See Carbin, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126937, at *2–*3.
313. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 23–24, 27.
314. See, e.g., Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 24–25 (“Defendants’ main tactic—as
reflected in declarations, scripts, calls, complaints, and other evidence—was to
falsely claim that consumers had committed a felony and would be arrested if
they did not pay within a number of hours, or even minutes.” Thus, when no such
action against the consumer ensued, the consumer would realize the collectors’
empty threats).
315. See Informant Interview, supra note 120.
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operations.316 A skip-tracing agency is defined as “[a] service
that locates persons (such as delinquent debtors . . .) or
missing assets.”317 The rise of modern technology has
drastically altered the nature of skip-tracing services.
Creditors or collectors no longer need to utilize a skip-tracing
agency to physically locate debtors—now they simply can
purchase an online skip-tracing service account to locate
debtors remotely.318 For example, in its online advertisement
the preferred skip-tracing service for WNY collectors,
TransUnion’s TLOxp, specifically targets collection agencies
and highlights the service’s ability to “locate even the
hardest to reach individuals.”319 This service allows
collectors to perform their own skip-tracing for a relatively
low cost without ever leaving the office.320
While skip-tracing services, such as TLOxp are greatly
beneficial when used for legitimate purposes, they are also a
critical element that facilitates illegal collection practices.
Armed with only a name and prior address, collectors can
obtain an unfathomable amount of debtors’ personal
316. See ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127.
317. Skiptracing Agency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
318. E.g., TLOxp, The Ultimate Skip Tracking Tool that Delivers Deeper
Insights, TRANSUNION (Nov. 20, 2016, 5:40 PM), http://www.tlo.com/collectionsvideo (describing the power of their service and its benefits it is for collections).
See also ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127; NYAG Press Release, supra note
247.
319. TLOxp, supra note 318. TLOxp’s online advertisement description of its
services states:
TLOxp is a skip tracing solution that provides fresher, more timely contact data so you can reach consumers earlier in the collections cycle and
recover more dollars. Now that TLOxp® has joined TransUnion’s portfolio of solutions, the next generation in deep skip tracing tools contains
information on an estimated 95% of the U.S. population. Leverage our
massive data repository and unmatched linking algorithms to locate
even the hardest to reach individuals and businesses that owe debt.
TLOxp returns critical data on key debtor information such as current
phone numbers, addresses, relatives, associates, place of employment
and much more at the lowest transactional costs in the industry. Id.
320. See id. (“TLOxp returns critical data . . . at the lowest transactional costs
in the industry.”).

290

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

information.321 This information serves as a basis for
collector’s misrepresentations.322 Debtors are inherently apt
to believe that the collector is legitimate when the caller
knows information such as their current address, license
number, and social security number.323
To make matters worse, remote skip-tracing service
providers either lack sufficient oversight procedures to
monitor their product’s use, or the procedures currently
employed are grossly insufficient to ensure that subscribers
comply with the terms and conditions of permissible use.324
Likewise, these service providers lack pre-screening
procedures for potential subscribers—instead, they offer a
free trial subscription to essentially anyone interested in
their service.325
The only readily identifiable oversight procedure skiptracing service providers purportedly employ is to monitor
users’ internet service provider (ISP) address. Ideally, this
measure allows only one subscriber to login at a time.326
Given modern technology, however, this “oversight” is
entirely ineffective. Nearly all WNY agencies set up their
system such that one collector can sign into the software
321. See id.
322. See, e.g., HALPERN, supra note 191, at 14–15 (describing how collectors can
use consumers’ information obtained through skip-tracing software to influence
the consumer into paying). See also TLOxp, supra note 318.
323. See TLOxp, supra note 318; HALPERN, supra note 191, at 14–15.
324. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBT: THE CHALLENGES
CHANGE 18–20 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
public_events/debt-collection-2.0-%E2%80%93-protecting-consumers-technologi
es-change/dcwr.pdf.
OF

325. E.g., TLOxp, supra note 318 (“If you’re new to TLOxp, Try [sic] it out for
FREE* and witness the difference powerful searches can make.”). In fact, while
conducting research for this Comment, not only was I unable to find any reference
to any standards for screening subscribers to ensure their product’s legitimate
use, but I personally received a phone call from a TLO representative, who
wanted to offer me a seven-day free trial service subscription after I visited their
website.
326. Informant Interview, supra note 120 (stating that this informant had a
TLO account that the entire office used).
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while the rest of the office accesses the account remotely.327
To monitors, this appears as a single subscriber using a
known ISP address when, in reality, the entire office has
access to the software.328
The critical role skip-tracing software plays in WNY
collection agencies’ fraudulent scheme cannot be overstated.
Many illegal practices described in this Comment are only
possible through the use of skip-tracing software.329 Without
access to this software, collectors could not “scramble”
portfolios nor collect off lead-sheets because they would lack
sufficient information to even contact their intended
victims.330 Or, even if collectors could contact their target,
they would lack sufficient knowledge about the target’s
personal information to render their misrepresentations
remotely plausible.331
Relatedly, the aggregate potential for harm that such
unfettered access to consumers’ personal information may
cause remains unknown. What is clear is that the
possibilities are endless for creative criminals.332 To
reiterate, most collectors are far from model citizens; in fact,
many already have extensive criminal backgrounds.333
Access to this degree of information promotes an
environment ripe for identity theft.334 These risks are more
than just unsettling; for those who are particularly at risk,
the ramifications are terrifying. Imagine, for example, the
potential risk for a domestic violence victim if their abuser

327. See id.
328. See id.
329. See ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127 (“Without technology
[criminal debt collection activity] doesn’t happen . . . [t]echnology drives the
case.”).
330. See supra Section III.B.
331. See HALPERN, supra note 191, at 14; Davis Interview, supra note 7.
332. See, e.g., ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127.
333. See supra Section III.E.1; HALPERN, supra note 191, at 13–14.
334. See HALPERN, supra note 191, at 7.
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could obtain all of their personal information.335 While the
extent of these risks is not yet known, one thing is certain—
they are unacceptable.
IV. ISSUES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
Buffalo stands alone in the debt collection industry.336
Surely there are collection agencies engaging in illegal
practices elsewhere, but these occurrences are far more
isolated and pale in comparison to those occurring in
WNY.337 Once the debt collection boom began, it did not take
long for the proverbial floodgates to open and for illegal
practices to spread like wildfire across the region.338 Shortly
thereafter, the FTC, CFPB, and NYAG’s Buffalo Regional
Office started receiving an unprecedented number of
consumer “third party debt collection” complaints.339
Curiously, Buffalo stood alone—no other NYAG regional
office received more than a handful of debt collection
complaints.340 At this time, the NYAG’s database did not
even have a classification code for these complaints. Without
complaints appearing elsewhere in the state, debt collection
appeared as a relatively insignificant, isolated problem, so
enforcing collection laws took a backseat to seemingly morepressing illegal activities. This allowed unlawful conduct to
335. Cf. Johnson, supra note 23, at 24–28 (describing the predatory tactics,
which Johnson argues that disproportionally and adversely affect women, who
may be more susceptible to these practices. The same disparaging effects flow
from unfettered access to information, but, in this case, the devastating effects
could prove disastrous far beyond pecuniary harm).
336. See supra notes 77 & 136 and accompanying text. See generally HALPERN,
supra note 191, at 12.
337. Illegal collection tactics also occur in other geographic areas, but not at
the rate or regularity that they occur in WNY. See generally Johnson, supra note
23 (noting throughout the article that collectors from outside WNY are engaging
in similar tactics).
338. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
339. See generally CFPB DATABASE, supra note 126; Davis Interview, supra
note 7.
340. Davis Interview, supra note 7.
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permeate the region, rapidly increasing in both severity and
pervasiveness.341 Employees fired for violating collection
laws would simply move on to another agency where they
introduced the same illegal tactics.342 Then, noticing their
new coworker’s success, other employees naturally adopted
the same tactics.343
If these illegal practices are so pervasive among WNY
collection agencies, the question naturally follows: why
hasn’t law enforcement done something to stop it? The short
answer is that law enforcement agencies are trying, but lack
the resources to do so effectively. This answer does not
sufficiently address the complexities of the problem however.
First, regarding criminal conduct, these offenses
frequently go unnoticed in the region because New York
outlawed payday lending and collection within the state.344
This prohibition conceals collectors’ illegal conduct from law
enforcement officials in the region,345 allowing collectors to
fly under law enforcement’s radar, and coincidently enables
the industry’s isolated boom in WNY.
The New York prohibition only protects New Yorkers.
Collectors may collect payday loans from New York State as
long as the target debtor resides elsewhere.346 This
distinction creates an environment tailored to this type of
341. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 27–60. See generally HALPERN, supra
note 191.
342. See HALPERN, supra note 191, at 14–15.
343. See id. (discussing the tendency of collectors to simply move from agency
to agency).
344. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40; N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 340, 373.
345. See Davis Interview, supra note 7 (discussing interactions with local law
enforcement, Ms. Davis stated: “They simply have no clue how the industry
functions. Collectors go to their parole officers’ who don’t second-guess [the
collectors] when they say they work in “telemarketing” or “customer service;”
what else would they say—’I’m point-caller.’”).
346. New York State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Payday Lending in New York: What
You Need to Know (May 15, 2014, 11:01 am), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/
consumer/paydayloans.htm (“It is also illegal for a debt collector to collect, or
attempt to collect, on a payday loan in New York State.”) (emphasis added).
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criminal activity because it segregates victims from the
collectors who prey on them.347 Already overworked, local
law enforcement officials’ primary concern is protecting their
local constituency. Despite the flagrant criminality occurring
within their jurisdiction, a dearth of victims blinded local law
enforcement officials to the fraudulent conspiracy afoot.348
Even if local officials had realized the degree of illegal
activity occurring sooner, they could not have afforded to
allocate sufficient resources to remediate the problem at
their constituents’ expense.349 Local officials are primarily
concerned with protecting local constituents, and rightfully
so. This is especially true for elected officials who count on
constituents’ votes for reelection.
This is not to say that public officials condone or willfully
ignore ongoing criminal activity within their jurisdiction. On
one hand, victims, who are nearly universally located outside
New York, are unlikely to report complaints in WNY.350 On
the other hand, local police or district attorneys’ offices, for
example, simply have too many local cases to refocus their
attention.351 Thus, the effect is two-fold: lacking a
substantial number of victim reports, local officials do not
realize the gravity of harm caused by collectors, but even if
they did, rarely can local officials allocate sufficient time and
resources to conduct a thorough investigation.352
The limited number of complaints trickling back to local
authorities fails to paint an adequate picture of the pervasive
347. See Neil Bhutta et. al., Consumer Borrowing After Payday Loan Bans, 59
J. L. & ECON. 225, 227 (2016).
348. See, e.g., Davis Interview, supra note 7.
349. See, e.g., id.
350. See CFPB DATABASE, supra note 126.
351. See Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G.
Schneiderman Releases New York’s Top Ten Frauds of 2016, Warns Consumers
to Beware of Scammers (Mar. 6, 2017), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/agschneiderman-releases-new-yorks-top-ten-frauds-2016-warns-consumersbeware-scammers.
352. See Davis Interview, supra note 7.
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fraudulent conduct.353 Viewed in isolation, no matter how
sympathetic the victim or egregious the collector’s conduct,
complaints are written off as rare occurrences perpetrated by
a handful of rogue collectors.354 With local officials’ scarce
time and resources already extended to their outer limits, the
costs attending complex, time-consuming investigations
clearly appear to outweigh the benefits when there are no
local victims.
The inter-state nature of this fraudulent debt collection
scheme hinders both criminal and civil actions.355 For
example, New York General Business Law § 349 expressly
prohibits any “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of
any business, trade or commerce.”356 Courts have afforded
Section 349 broad construction, interpreting any consumeroriented business practice having the “capacity to mislead or
deceive a reasonable person” sufficient for establishing a
statutory violation.357
On the other hand, while the NYAG’s powers are
expressly confined to specific matters, they are particularly
narrow in the context of criminal prosecution.358 This
353. See id. (noting that because they lack familiarity with the industry, local
authorities fail to fully grasp the extent of debt collectors’ fraudulent scheme even
when complaints are received).
354. See Davis Interview, supra note 7. While the CFPB receives substantial
complaints regarding Buffalo debt collectors, local enforcement agencies often do
not receive them. See generally CFPB DATABASE, supra note 126.
355. See Kaufman v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686–88
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (pointing out that N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 does not extend to
cases where a deceptive scheme originates in N.Y. but injurious consumer
transaction occurs elsewhere).
356. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(a).
357. Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 725 N.E.2d 598, 606 (N.Y. 1999).
358. People v. Goldswer, 358 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (Schoharie Cty. Ct. 1974)
(highlighting that legislative action has expressly limited the general jurisdiction
prosecutorial power conferred unto the Attorney General to cases where certain
conditions precedent are met). But see People v. General Electric Co., Inc., 756
N.Y.S. 2d 520, 523 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (noting that N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12)
authorizes the Attorney General to take legal action protecting consumers from
acts that have “the capacity or tendency to deceive, or creates an atmosphere
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reaffirms the principle that the NYAG’s duties are primarily
civil.359 Under Section 349, the NYAG is empowered to, and
frequently does, pursue civil actions to seek restitution for
victims of consumer fraud perpetrated within the state.360
The statute’s primary purpose is to provide a remedy for any
victims of consumer fraud. However, the NYAG’s primary
duty is to the people of New York. For this reason, the NYAG
alone cannot utilize the statute’s broad scope while
adequately upholding its duty to the people of New York.
Exacerbating this, the illegal conduct is isolated to WNY,
and the NYAG’s Buffalo Regional Office has a single attorney
responsible for the entire Consumer Fraud Bureau.
Likewise, NYAG criminal prosecutors cannot divert
attention from their substantial caseload. Thus, like local
authorities, scarce resources preclude the NYAG from
undertaking the type of comprehensive legal action, criminal
or civil, necessary to adequately enforce consumer protection
laws regulating debt collection.
In addition to the NYAG, New York General Business
Law § 349 provides a private cause of action for actual
victims harmed by deceptive or fraudulent business
practices.361 Unfortunately, for these victims, more often

conducive to fraud.”); State v. Princess Prestige, 366 N.E. 2d 61, 62 (1977).
359. But see Gaidon, 725 N.E.2d at 603 (stating that N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349
expressly confers unto the Attorney General “enforcement power to curtail
deceptive acts and practices—willful or otherwise—directed at the consuming
public”); In re Prudential Advert. Inc. v. Attorney Gen., N.Y.S.2d 491, 492–93
(N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (noting that, under N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12), the Attorney
General “clearly is authorized to investigate alleged repeated acts committed in
the course of the conduct of business activities in this State which are fraudulent
within the meaning which the law by common usage attaches to that word.”).
360. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(b) (empowering the Attorney General to
bring actions against any legal entity engaging in deceptive practices and to
“obtain restitution of any moneys or property obtained directly or indirectly by
any such unlawful acts or practices.”).
361. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349; Bildstein v. MasterCard
Int’l Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 410, 413–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (delineating the elements
a plaintiff must establish under § 349, and noting that § 349 is modeled after
section 5. of the Fed. Trade Comm’n Act (FTCA)).
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than not, legal recourse is not a viable option to obtain
restitution. Between fictitious agency names, call spoofing
technology, collector aliases, and constantly changing phone
numbers with various area codes, consumer-victims are
fortunate just to figure out the collectors are located in New
York—never mind locate a physical address at which to serve
collectors.362
In addition, because of collectors’ misrepresentations,
consumers believe that these collectors actually are law
enforcement officials located in their own jurisdiction.363
Assuming a consumer-victim actually could identify and
locate the collectors, more often than not consumer-victims
lack the resources to travel to New York and pursue even a
small claims action, much less hire an attorney to represent
them in civil litigation.364
Further limiting consumer-victims’ access to legal
recourse, Section 349 only provides a cause of action for those
who have suffered actual pecuniary harm.365 Harassment
alone is insufficient for consumers to seek relief. More
importantly, prudent consumers who do not pay are unlikely
to even report unlawful collection attempts because they
didn’t suffer any pecuniary harm.366 This hinders law
enforcement because consumers who had the wherewithal to
realize the collector’s fraudulent purpose are the ones most
likely to retain useful information that could aid law

362. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 29–35.
363. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127 (“call spoofing technology that
allows your caller id to show that you’re from the town court, or a law office, or
the judges’ office, or the police department, you know people tend to believe what
they see and when your caller id says you’re from the police department . . .”) See
also Pfeiffer, supra note 8.
364. See Chin, supra note 41, at 727–28.
365. Bildstein, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 415 (holding that actual damages are a
requisite element of § 349). But see 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k) (2011) (allowing the court
to grant, “in the case of any action by an individual,” additional damages up to
$1000).
366. See Bildstein, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 415.
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enforcement.
Another issue for individual consumer-victims is that a
legal defense exists, which provides an exception for process
who act merely as agents of their principal—the legally
responsible party.367 Collectors have recently stretched this
to its logical extremes. While attorneys can overcome this
defense without much difficulty, for private consumervictims who lack the time and resources to hire an attorney
private litigation becomes even more difficult and
expensive.368
Even where authorities can allocate sufficient resources
to conduct an investigation and obtain a judgment or consent
order enjoining illegal practices and providing restitution for
victims, this does little to actually resolve the problem. One
reason is that judgments only affect the agency and possibly
a few higher-up individual defendants. Such a judgment is
entirely ineffective for enjoining individual collectors—the
ones actually engaging in the unlawful conduct.369
There is a disconnect here. Collectors are most successful
when they violate the law, which reflects in their paychecks.
Yet, they are entirely unaffected by a judgment enjoining the
agency or their superiors from engaging in fraudulent
acts.370 These collectors can simply move on to another
collection agency. Civil actions, therefore, do not impact
collectors in the slightest and, undeterred, their conduct

367. See Sykes v. Mel Harris & Assocs., LLC, 757 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
368. See id. at 423 (explaining that the process sever exemption does not apply
to those who go “beyond being merely being a messenger . . . and engages [sic] in
prohibited abusive or harassing activities to force an individual to repay a debt.”).
369. See generally id.
370. Cf. NYAG Press Release, supra note 242 (discussing a lawsuit the
Attorney General won against a debt collection agency). But see Davis Interview,
supra note 7 (insisting that while the Attorney General won that lawsuit, the
Buffalo Regional Office’s Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection has
uncovered evidence indicating that many of the collectors are still working in the
industry).
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continues. In this way, acting alone, the NYAG’s efforts
achieve no better results than a dog chasing its tail;
“catching” the problem doesn’t make it go away.
In sum, by prohibiting payday lending, New York has
effectively protected its own citizens while simultaneously
providing a de facto safe-harbor for collectors’ flagrantly
fraudulent activity. On top of that, the complex, interstate
nature of these cases present obstacles for local authorities
attempting to enjoin illegal and deceptive practices.
Collectors wantonly violate the law, but the violations are
not reported to WNY officials who have jurisdiction over the
wrongful actors.
It then follows, assuming that state and local officials
cannot adequately monitor, prevent, or enjoin fraudulent
activity for various reasons, that enforcement would logically
fall unto a federal agency.371 Once again, the uniqueness,
infancy, and isolation of this fraudulent industry poses
significant barriers for federal agencies. Few, if any, victims
think to report illegal collection tactics to federal agencies
such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), or even the Secret
Service—all of whom have jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute these crimes.372 Again, without receiving
complaints, these agencies are too attenuated from the
unlawful conduct to recognize its pervasiveness in the
region.373
Federal agencies’ broad jurisdiction enables them to
investigate various criminal operations throughout the
country, but the WNY debt collection industry presents
371. See ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127 (highlighting that federal
enforcement agencies are critical in conducting debt collection investigations).
372. Davis Interview, supra note 7 (“who would think to call Homeland? People
think of Homeland [Security] and they think ‘what does debt collection have to
do with terrorism?’”).
373. While federal agencies (the FTC & CFPB) compile and monitor
complaints, they do not have criminal enforcement power. See CFPB DATABASE,
supra note 126; ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127.
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unique challenges that agents do not regularly encounter.
They are entirely unfamiliar with debt collection, especially
the operational schemes unique to WNY. While these
agencies are great at investigating and prosecuting a wide
variety of criminal enterprises, the complex nature of this
industry along with the collection agencies’ efforts to conceal
illegal practices in a shroud of legitimacy effectively inhibit
federal agents from recognizing the illegality attending debt
collection in the WNY region.374
The mere conceptualization of where to start
investigating is difficult in debt collection cases.375 Consumer
complaints are often the only evidence at the onset of a
case.376 While these complaints are necessary to demonstrate
the illegal and malicious nature of collection attempts,
consumers inadvertently throw “red herrings” into their
complaints because they do not know what information is
pertinent to an investigation. Conversely, other consumer
complaints lack pertinent evidence, which is precisely why
private individuals are rarely successful obtaining
restitution through private litigation.
To succeed in either a civil action or criminal charge, the
complaining party must unravel a confusing maze of
fictitious “company” names, phone numbers, payment
processing accounts, and aliases.377 The process of doing so
374. See ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127.
375. See generally DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A
NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, (2009),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf.
376. See Angela Littwin, Why Process Complaints? Then and Now, 87 TEMP. L.
REV. 895, 896–98 (2015).
377. FTC v. Vantage Point Servs., LLC et al., No. 15-CV-0006-WMS-HKS,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111084, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 17, 2017) (describing the
amount of evidence gathered pursuant the FTC and NYAG’s motion for summary
judgment against a debt collection operation, the Judge stated: “[t]he [Plaintiff’s]
SOF attaches 470 exhibits totaling more than 1,500 pages. The exhibits consist
of excerpts from Defendants’ depositions, consumer declarations, correspondence,
business records, telephone recording transcriptions, discovery responses, and
other evidence concerning the Defendants’ alleged unlawful debt collection
practices.”).
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is not only time consuming, but also requires familiarity with
these companies’ business structure, which is by no means
intuitive. Another problem is that collectors are careful to not
reveal their true identities or physical address to either
consumers-victims or law enforcement officials.378 If they do
provide an address, it invariably leads to a P.O. box that
frequently is located in another state.379 If nothing else,
collectors are at least consistent in maintaining their
misrepresentations that they are located outside of New
York.380 Thus, to render the representation plausible,
collection agencies will establish mailing addresses by
purchasing P.O. boxes in many different states.381
Another issue is that these companies change their
names, at least as far as the name stated to debtors,
incredibly often.382 This makes locating them difficult.
Moreover, the frequency with which these companies
misrepresent their company names exacerbates difficulties
locating their physical address, payment processing
accounts, and phone numbers because all of these are tied to
various fictitious or assumed company names. This can
easily ensnare investigators attempting to untangle such a
web. When the company is actually located, however, due to
the frequency that these agencies “stash” corporation names,
bank accounts, and payment information, the physical
378. See, e.g., 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 819 (noting that “[a] defendant’s
attempt to hide his or her identity may be admissible as bearing on the
consciousness of guilt,” which should say a lot about collectors who absolutely
refuse to disclose their name, company name, or address). See also Davis
Interview, supra note 7 (stating that collectors use a different name nearly every
week).
379. Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 33–34.
380. See, e.g., id.
381. See, e.g., id. at 33–34. Cf. Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 1
(misrepresenting to a Florida consumer that “Governor Rick Scott had recently
signed a bill to allow Florida criminals to be extradited from Florida to Michigan.”
The collector went on to say that “[h]e was coordinating with the state of
Michigan on [the consumer’s] case, and that if [the consumer] didn’t pay, [he]
would serve 76 months in a Michigan penitentiary.”).
382. See, e.g., Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 5–7.
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location does not help trace the funds generated because
collectors can move funds and switch accounts at will.383
Finally, the structure that these agencies employ to
effectuate their scheme helps insulate them from liability.384
On paper, they segregate collectors’ illegal tactics from debt
owners and the collections from the payment processor; all of
which are working as part of a conspiracy.385
While local WNY prosecutors lack victims to charge
criminal collectors under New York Law,386 prosecutors
located within victims’ jurisdiction fail to realize the extent
of the harm caused because there are few victims within
their jurisdiction as well. Collectors rely on this systematic
anonymity.387 Anonymity is easily achieved when isolated
incidents are viewed as such because the harm this scheme
causes appears relatively small unless it is viewed
aggregately.388
Collectors attack vulnerable individuals and demand
relatively small sums to avoid detection.389 Seeing only one
or two victim complaint(s), foreign District Attorney’s offices
cannot justify the substantial effort required to bring

383. See, e.g., Pfeiffer, supra note 8. See generally Davis Decl., supra note 105,
at 2–19 (outlining the complex monetary transfers between “distinct” companies
involved in a common criminal enterprise).
384. See, e.g., Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 13–16.
385. See FTC v. Vantage Point Servs., LLC et al., No. 15-CV-0006-WMS-HKS,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111084, at *16–*21 (W.D.N.Y. July 17, 2017) (outlining
the factors relevant for establishing a common enterprise—”(1) maintain officers
and employees in common, (2) operate under common control, (3) share offices,
(4) commingle funds, and (5) share advertising and marketing (internal citations
omitted)”—and, finding a material issue of fact as to each element, denying
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment).
386. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.60(2) (2016).
387. See, e.g., Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 13–16.
388. See ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127.
389. See generally Ian Ayers et al., Skeletons in the Database: An Early
Analysis of the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 343
(2014) (demonstrating that this issue is only trivial when viewed in isolation, but
a massive fraudulent scheme is readily apparent when viewed aggregately).
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collectors to justice for stealing only a few hundred dollars.390
That does not even address the jurisdictional issues likely to
arise in such a scenario, which renders victims without
recourse should they want to press criminal charges.391 Thus,
it falls to civil bureaus to enforce civil consumer protection
laws despite many of the violations’ criminal nature.
CONCLUSION: MOVING FORWARD, WHAT CAN BE DONE?
The interstate nature of fraudulent debt collection
practices calls for federal criminal enforcement.392 This
solution, however, creates a dichotomy not only between civil
and criminal agencies but also State and Federal. The FTC
and CFPB, both federal agencies, are the ones receiving and
monitoring consumer complaints, yet both lack criminal
enforcement powers.393 None of the federal agencies with
criminal enforcement powers, such as the FBI or DHS,
monitor consumer complaints. This leaves them in the dark
regarding pervasive criminal conduct necessitating
investigation. Moreover, all of these federal agencies lack
sufficient familiarity with the issues unique to the WNY
region.
Conversely, local or state agencies with this familiarity
lack adequate resources and a sufficient number of victims
to justify a lengthy, criminal investigation.394 Readily
apparent is the need for multi-agency cooperation and
communication before law enforcement can combat the
region’s ongoing criminal conduct. Without multi-agency
cooperation or allocating sufficient resources for

390. See generally id.
391. See ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127.
392. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127.
393. See, e.g., CFPB DATABASE, supra note 126. See generally, Littwin, supra
note 376.
394. Davis Interview, supra note 7 (“There should be a whole team dedicated
to these investigations. Instead, it’s just me doing this while trying to fulfil my
other employment duties.”).
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investigations, illegal practices will continue undeterred;
“it’s like playing ‘whack-a-mole,’” when one goes down, two
more spring up.395
Joint investigations are the way forward if enforcement
agencies are serious about eliminating, or at least greatly
reducing, illegal collection tactics. But even multi-agency
cooperation presents new obstacles for law enforcement
officials.
The first is the distinction between criminal and civil
enforcement agencies or bureaus. Civil agencies operate
under different rules than their criminal counterparts. For
example, while the NYAG has the power to issue subpoenas
in both civil and criminal matter, only its criminal divisions
are empowered to obtain search and seizure warrants.396
Similarly, state and federal agencies also operate under
different standards. When involved in a joint investigation,
both state and federal agencies must proceed carefully to
verify that they permissibly disseminate evidence uncovered
with each other to ensure that shared materials are not
tainted as evidence.
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA), for
example, “prohibits the use in evidence of any intercepted
communications or evidence derived therefrom if the
disclosure of such information would be in violation of the
wiretap statute.”397 When enacted, Congress intended to
protect an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.398 These

395. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127.
396. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(8) (empowering the Attorney-General’s office to
issue subpoenas duces tecum and to possess and retain subpoenaed materials in
accordance with the provisions of the N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2305(C). Furthermore, N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 610.25 provides the bounds of reasonable possession and
retention of subpoenaed documents in the context of criminal investigations. See
also, e.g., Hynes v Moskowitz, 377 N.E.2d 446, 449 (1978).
397. In re Kan. City Star Co., 527 F. Supp. 70, 76–77 (W.D. Mo. 1981), vacated
on other grounds 666 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1981) (highlighting that Congress
intended for the Act to protect “oral communications”).
398. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(11), 2518(10)(a).
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legislators could not possibly have foreseen technological
developments rendering OCCA protections much broader
than originally intended. For the purposes of the OCCA,
Congress’ defined “wire communication” as:
[A]ny aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of
facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire,
cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the
point of reception . . . furnished or operated by any person engaged
in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce.399

Currently, this broad definition applies to any data
stored in cyberspace—including nearly all data stored in “the
cloud.” Anything that could even remotely be construed as a
“communication” meets this definition. Collection software
electronically preserves collectors’ notes entered in debtors’
accounts. Because other collectors can see each other’s notes
in the software, courts could reasonably conclude that these
notes are “communications” within the OCCA’s definition.400
Thus, criminal agencies, even with a valid warrant, could
potentially taint any evidence shared with any civil agencies
working in conjunction with them.
The good news is that enforcement agencies at the local,
state, and federal levels have all begun to realize the need
for remedial action.401 Collectors’ pervasive illegal conduct is
slowly gaining more attention from local police as well as
agencies such as the NYAG, FTC, CFPB, DHS, and FBI.
These agencies are realizing both the necessity and utility of
399. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2017).
400. A broad reading of this statute clearly renders collections software with
the ambit of the statute, but not even remotely in the spirit of the law. See id.
401. See, e.g., Gene Warner & Jerry Zremski, Buffalo Debt Collector Pleads
Guilty
in
Massive
Fraud,
BUFF.
NEWS,
Nov.
2,
2016,
https://buffalonews.com/2016/11/02/head-buffalo-debt-collection-agency-pleadsguilty-fraud/; Guilty Pleas by 4, Charges Against 11 Announced in Federal Fraud
Prosecution of Buffalo Debt Collectors, BUFF. NEWS, Oct. 27, 2015
http://buffalonews.com/2015/10/27/guilty-pleas-by-4-charges-against-11announced-in-federal-fraud-prosecution-of-buffalo-debt-collectors/.

306

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

joint investigations.402 Unfortunately, such realizations
needed to come earlier when illegal practices had yet to
permeate the vast majority of WNY collection agencies.
To date, prosecutors have only obtained a few criminal
convictions against Buffalo-based debt collectors; the
convictions being for criminal offenses such as wire fraud or
aggravated identity theft.403 This is a step in the right
direction, but criminal prosecution cannot stop at a few
convictions if authorities want to remediate the widespread
illegality occurring in the industry. Nor can officials charge
only those in supervisory roles, such as agency’ managers
and owners, while allowing the collectors actually making
calls to escape unscathed. Proceeding in this manner only
pushes these collectors to move on to another agency, where
they introduce and perpetuate the illegal tactics to which
they are accustomed.404
Across WNY, the universal theme is that illegal
collections all revolve around a “scheme or artifice to
defraud.”405 The managers and owners are typically the ones
held accountable for devising such a scheme or artifice, but
that does not excuse individual collectors from intentionally
perpetrating one or more specific fraudulent acts within the
scheme, including mail-fraud,406 wire-fraud,407 health-care
fraud,408 government benefit fraud,409 aggravated identity
402. See ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127; Vaughters, supra note 43.
403. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 51; Phil Fairbanks, Buffalo Debt
Collectors Accused of Taking in ‘Tens of Millions’ by Harassing Consumers, BUFF.
NEWS, Nov. 2, 2016, https://buffalonews.com/2016/11/02/buffalo-debt-collectoraccused-harassing-consumers/; Fairbanks, supra note 1.
404. See supra note 194–197 and accompanying text.
405. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2017) (defining a “scheme or artifice to defraud”).
406. See §§ 1037, 1341 (criminalizing both mail fraud and electronic mail
fraud).
407. See § 1343.
408. See § 1347.
409. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 608–609 (2017) (defining public assistance fraud and the
penalties for violations).
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theft,410 tax evasion,411 and/or money laundering.412 Given
collectors’ apparent desire to perpetrate any and every kind
of fraud, law enforcement officials ought to respond
accordingly by prosecuting each and every culpable
participant.413
Criminally prosecuting lower level employees who
intentionally commit criminal acts would demonstrate that
such acts will no longer go unpunished. Simply being a pointcaller, for example, who did not devise the scheme, should
not exonerate an individual from culpable participation in
such a fraudulent scheme. Additionally, with smaller
operations the NYAG and local District Attorneys’ offices
ought to assume the responsibility for bringing criminal
charges against collectors under New York law.414
New York should also require licensing for agencies
regularly involved in debt brokering or collecting. Ideally,
licensing requirements would allow law enforcement to
monitor collection agencies, their tactics, and employees.415
Registration and licensing requirements, if implemented

410. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.
411. See 26 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq. (criminalizing specific acts relating to tax
evasion).
412. See 31 U.S.C. § 5342 (2017).
413. Collectors in WNY are apparently very familiar with the criminal justice
system—they do represent themselves as lawyers after all—so defending a “twopart federal criminal complaint,” just like one that they threatened victims with,
shouldn’t burden them much at all, right? But see Fairbanks, supra note 1
(describing Alan Ceccarelli’s 78-month federal prison sentence for engaging in
abusive and unlawful collections, which seems ironically similar to the threats
he made against victims of his collection scheme).
414. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 190.25, 190.26, 190.50, & 190.60; N.Y. GEN. BUS.
LAW §600 et seq. (providing that violating New York collection laws, which are
nearly identical to the FDCPA, amounts to a misdemeanor offense).
415. Employees misstate their position as “customer service representatives”
or “telemarketers,” which allows them to maintain employment in a position they
should not be in. Registration could potentially preclude many ex-convicts from
having access to skip-tracing software. Likewise, this could make it much more
difficult for collectors to defraud public assistance programs. See Davis Interview,
supra note 7.
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correctly, would also require collection agencies to disclose
their physical operating location. Likewise, licensing should
also require collectors to disclose all active phone lines, and
notify the state regulating agency within forty-eight hours of
any changes. However, there are two shortcomings
accompanying registration and/or licensing requirements for
debt collection agencies. First, implementing such a system
is potentially costly. Second, even with a licensing or
registration process in place, the registry alone is useless
without adequate oversight.416
Further legislative action could aid law enforcement
officials in investigating illicit debt collection operations.
Both Congress and New York’s legislature ought to amend,
repeal, or clarify outdated statutes—such as the OCCA for
example. On the other hand, while many legal scholars argue
stronger legislation is necessary to remediate certain highinterest lending,417 this type of legislation alone is
insufficient.
Between the FDCPA and various state laws regulating
predatory lending practices, ineffective consumer protection
laws are not the problem. The protections currently in place
provide adequate protection—it is the enforcement of these
protections that is lacking.418 New legislation would not
address the current limitations authorities face when
attempting to eradicate fraudulent practices. Likewise,
tribal nations, generally, are the most notorious predatory
payday lenders. But, because they can assert a sovereign
416. Mary Spector, Taming The Beast: Payday Loans, Regulatory Efforts, and
Unintended Consequences, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 961, 996 (2008) (concluding that
“[s]ustained enforcement by state and federal agencies is a critical element in
effectively monitoring compliance” regarding high interest borrowing such as
payday loans).
417. See, e.g., Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans,
81 Fed. Reg. 47864–01 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
1041).
418. See Spector, supra note 416, at 995–96 (outlining proposed regulations
aimed at “taming the beast” that is the payday lending industry, but conceding
that “voluntary compliance by payday lenders could not be expected”).
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immunity defense, effectually precluding legislation from
remediating the evils at which it is directed, further lending
regulations would prove ineffective.419
As opposed to legislating new regulations, simply
promulgating information to educate the public about
current collection laws, such as the FDCPA, would prove
cheaper and easier, while presumably achieving similar
results.420 The public needs more education so people realize
that defaulting on a private debt is not a criminal offense;
people need to know that neither they nor their loved ones
can be arrested or imprisoned for non-payment of these
debts. This would strip collectors of their intimidating tactics
on which they rely to perpetrate their fraudulent scheme.
That is not to say that legitimate debtors should not be held
responsible for valid contractual obligations, but government
officials must find a more effective remedy to strike a balance
between debtors’ and creditors’ rights to offset predatory
collection attempts.
Finally, should all other solutions prove unsuccessful,
one drastic option remains. Law enforcement could charge
everyone involved in an illegal collection scheme under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), which, ironically, Congress passed as part of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.421 RICO confers upon
419. See Adam Mayle, Usury On the Reservation: Regulation of TribalAffiliated Payday Lenders, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 1053, 1058–72 (2012)
(highlighting different states’ and agencies attempts to regulate payday lending
against tribal-affiliated payday lenders, and noting that “[t]his broad conception
of tribal immunity has permitted tribal groups to pursue a wide range of
commercial activities that are beyond effective regulation, including payday
lending”).
420. Cf. Lisa Lake, Stand up to Fake Debt Collectors, FED. TRADE COMMISSION:
CONSUMER INFO. (Apr. 10, 2015), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/stand-fakedebt-collectors.
421. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2017) (“It shall be unlawful for any person who has
received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt . . .”); Unencumbered Assets,
Tr. v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters.), 617 F. Supp.
2d 700, 711 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (holding that “[w]hile it is true that ‘jurisdiction over
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law enforcement the ability to criminally charge and
prosecute all individuals involved in a particular criminal
enterprise or racketeering conspiracy.422 Albeit drastic,
charging everyone from the lowest-level collectors to the
ringleaders would send a loud and clear message to others
employed in the industry that this behavior will not be
tolerated.
Moreover, if low-level collectors realize their liberty is in
jeopardy, it is unlikely that they would continue to protect
their superiors, who reap enormous financial benefits, while
collectors receive only modest wages.423 Collectors, on
average, are not sufficiently well-compensated to justify
taking the fall for their superiors. Therefore, if going after
collection agency employees in supervisory roles continues to
fall short of venerating consumer protection laws, utilizing
RICO, presumably, would foster collectors proffering and
becoming informants for law enforcement. Informants
coming forward would allow law enforcement to work their
way up chain to those orchestrating or facilitating unlawful
acts.
From the shadows, Western New York’s unregulated and
uninhibited debt collection industry has terrorized
Americans across the country. The anonymity now possible
through modern technology has shrouded the lawless nature
of collections and its pervasiveness in the WNY region. This,
in turn, fostered the “Wild West” atmosphere observable
today. Such unencumbered illegality presents a daunting
the individual officers of a corporation cannot be predicated merely upon
jurisdiction over the corporation’ . . . the mere fact that the actions connecting
defendants to the state were undertaken in an official rather than personal
capacity does not preclude the exercise of personal jurisdiction over those
defendants.”). This indicates that directors are subject to personal liability under
RICO for the corporation’s activities within a foreign state; the “corporate veil”
provides no protection if a common conspiracy is established.
422. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962 (2017) (defining prohibited acts and available
remedies).
423. See supra note 294 and accompanying text (providing that “Ciffa had a
total income of $1,284,951.04.”).
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task for law enforcement to effectively reign in these ongoing,
pervasive, and unlawful practices. Law enforcement has a
duty to undertake this task, for illegal tactics have farexceeded any bounds of reasonableness. While the first step
is to bring these illegal practices out from the shadows, this
alone is not enough. Taming WNY’s debt collection industry
will require the cooperation of law enforcement officials at
every level—local, state, and federal. Working jointly fosters
information sharing and allows each agency to utilize their
own unique powers, expertise, and resources. The
effectiveness of these solutions depends entirely on law
enforcement’s diligence and commitment to achieving results
because, working alone, no agency can effectively tame New
York’s west.

